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PREFACE 
This is the 26th of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to 
livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation. 
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries. Animals are a source 
of food, more specifically protein for human diets, income, employment and possibly 
foreign exchange. For low income producers, livestock can serve as a store of wealth, 
provide draught power and organic fertiliser for crop production and a means of 
transport. Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries, 
though starting from a low base, is growing rapidly.  
This paper presents a case study of how livestock policies are made and implemented 
in a national context, and how they can be improved to better serve the interests of 
the poor in Cambodia. Opportunities exist for improving rural livelihoods in Cambodia 
through the export of livestock. While Cambodia claims little of the official export 
market for cattle, huge demand exists within the region and beyond. Three strategic 
entry points are recommended that can both improve the performance of the sector 
and the participation of the poor in productive activities.  
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is 
welcome by the author, PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and 
Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Disclaimer 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any 
country, territory, city or area or its authorities or concerning the delimitations of its 
frontiers or boundaries. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and 
do not constitute in any way the official position of the FAO. 
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Sophal Ear, under the direction of David K. Leonard, University of California, Berkeley. 
E-mail: sophal@alumni.princeton.edu 
Acknowledgements 
Thanks are due to each and every person in the list of individuals met or contacted 
(found at the end of this document) who helped me by granting interviews, responding 
to queries, and educating me about livestock. This draft would not have been possible 
without the guidance and help of David Leonard, and the comments and suggestions of 
Elliott Potter, Sen Sovann, Stefano Linguenato, Soy Seng (who was indefatigable in 
helping me arrange meetings), Sao Sopheap, Emmanuelle Guerne Bleich, Nhu Miller, 
Teddy Miller, Elon Gilbert and Chamnan Lim. The usual caveats apply, all errors 
remain my own. 
Keywords 
Cambodia, policymaking, livestock, rural development, poverty. 
 
Date of publication: 11 August 2005  
iii 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ABAP   Agro Business & Agro Processing (Working Group) 
ACIAR    Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research 
ADB   Asian Development Bank 
APIP   Agricultural Productivity Improvement Project 
APS   Animal Production Services 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AusAID  Australian Agency for International Development 
CG   Consultative Group (Meeting) 
CPP   Cambodian People’s Party 
CSD   Center for Social Development 
DAHP   Department of Animal Health and Production  
DK   Democratic Kampuchea 
US DoS  United States Department of State 
EC   European Commission 
EPZs   Export Processing Zones 
FMD   Foot-and-Mouth Disease 
Funcinpec  Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, 
et Coopératif (Royalist Party) 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GoC   Government of Canada 
GPSF   Government Private Sector Forum 
GTZ    Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (German 
Technical Cooperation) 
HPAI   Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
IFAD   International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
KR   Khmer Rouge 
MAFF   Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, and Agriculture  
MEF   Ministry of Economy and Finance 
MFI   Microfinance Institution 
MoC   Ministry of Commerce 
MPDF   Mekong Project Development Facility 
MSG   Monosodium Glutamate 
NAHPIC  National Animal Health and Production Investigation Centre 
NGOs   Non-Governmental Organizations 
NPRS   National Poverty Reduction Strategy 
NSDP   National Strategic Development Plan Abbreviations 
iv 
OIE    Office International des Epizooties (World Organization for Animal 
Health) 
RCAF   Royal Cambodian Armed Forces 
RGC   Royal Government of Cambodia 
RS   Rectangular Strategy 
SEDPII  Socio-Economic Development Plan II 
SPS   Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
SRP   Sam Rainsy Party 
TA   Technical Assistance 
UFNSK  United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea 
UNICEF  United Nation Children’s Fund 
UNTAC  United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
UXOs   Unexploded Ordnances 
VAHWs  Village Animal Health Workers 
VRC   Vétérinaires Ruraux du Cambodge 
VSF   Vétérinaires Sans Frontières  
WFP   World Food Programme 




Agriculture is paramount to the Cambodian economy, accounting for almost half of 
GDP (1997-2001). Nearly 88% of the poor come from rural areas and 80% of the 
population is rural, yet the country does not have a medium-term agricultural sector 
strategy.  The livestock sub-sector ranks among the highest “potentials” and priorities 
for future development in Cambodia according to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fisheries, contributing 14% to the agricultural economy (1997-2001). It materially 
affects the lives of millions of Cambodians.  Agriculture’s primacy is undeniable, given 
that it is the only sector capable of absorbing the 150,000-250,000 entrants joining 
the labor force each year. This represents a tremendous opportunity for agriculture in 
general and livestock in particular. However, the last decade of development action 
has also shown donors (with the implicit consent of the government) unwilling or 
unable to contribute to agriculture, with only eight percent of aid going to that 
sector. Aid coordination, while a stated goal, remains elusive. 
The Political Context 
A difficult institutional environment manifests itself through a combination of weak 
state capacity and poor governance that limits the scope for reform.  Civil servant 
salaries are abysmally low (barely above the poverty line) for political economy and 
patronage reasons.  ‘Illegal taxation’ is pervasive with, for example, demands for 
heavy and frequent informal payments for transport of cattle within the country.   
There are numerous reasons for this, but three are of particular note: the legacy of 
the Khmer Rouge causing the death of a quarter of the population and decimating the 
country’s human resources; patron-client relations with an embedded culture of 
corruption that prevents pro-poor policies from being implemented; and a donor-
government nexus which has produced too many strategies and plans, but too few 
funded mandates and feasible policies.  
Politically, there is no alternative other than to work within the system if donors insist 
on dealing with the government. Some have refused. The US Congress does not allow 
any US funds to go directly to the Cambodian government, mandating that funds 
instead go through NGOs.  
The Economic Context 
Cambodia’s economic performance has enjoyed some notable successes in the last 
decade, especially in the area of macroeconomic stability, as the country embraced 
aspects of the Washington Consensus. Inflation has been low for a number of years, 
and the exchange rate is stable. These are flipsides to the same coin thanks to nearly 
complete dollarization (accounting for up to 90% of all liquidity). Cambodia became 
the first Least Developed Country to join the WTO in 2004. Despite the serious impact 
of corruption on Cambodia’s economy, the Heritage Foundation rates Cambodia as 
mostly free and ranks it above Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos. 
Other economic trends have not been favorable, beyond a veneer of moderate GDP 
growth of circa 5 percent. Human development outcomes have been poor in the 
1990s—this despite more than five billion US dollars in aid. Poverty and inequality 
have stagnated (and may even have worsened based on projections). Child and infant 
mortality have all increased since 1990. Expectations from interventions should be 
limited as observed from recent experience on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
(HPAI), where neighboring Vietnam was responsible for detecting Cambodia’s cases of 
human infection. Executive Summary 
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Policy Context 
The constraints to designing effective rural development programs can be summed up 
as shortages of key inputs, inaccessibility to markets, human insecurity, limited 
technical capacity at ministry level, limited skill base at village level, and 
disinclination towards community or group actions due to low social capital following 
the Khmer Rouge period (EC, 2001). The challenges suggest that the problems of 
livestock are much wider than just the sub-sector alone; they are agriculture-wide and 
economy-wide. Categorized broadly, they concern market problems such as 
widespread corruption in supply chains, lack of access to water and energy, and 
insecurity of land tenure. 
The government’s “Linear Animal Health Strategy and Policy Development” published 
in 2001 proposed both a Basic and a Smallholder Strategy. Several of its elements ran 
into difficulties because of the difficult institutional environment. With the guidance 
of existing strategies evaluated for political feasibility, three strategic entry points for 
pro-poor policy making are identified. 
Strategic Entry Points 
These recommendations are by no means exhaustive, but it is believed that they offer 
politically feasible opportunities for pro-poor engagement in livestock and livestock-
sector related activities: 
1. A two-pronged strategic entry point: (a) Take advantage of the increased emphasis 
on agriculture at the December 2004 Consultative Group meeting to produce a 
medium term agricultural sector strategy that includes NGO involvement and 
targets widows or single women heads of household and families that own no 
draught animals; and (b) Support HPAI interventions that consider training of 
poultry producers and subsidize microfinance to producers whose birds have been 
culled (especially if they meet the above criteria of widows or single women heads 
of households). 
2. Cambodia is poised to take advantage of growing regional demand for livestock, 
and it should not fail to do so because the window of opportunity is narrowing with 
FMD-free status required for exports by 2006 and SPS Agreement by 1 January 
2008
1.  Thus Cambodia should exploit its comparative advantage in livestock 
exports (especially cattle), regionally and internationally and consider creation of 
an FMD-free zone.  A feasibility study could be funded by the private sector and/or 
donors such as AusAID. 
3. Because development outcomes have been so disappointing in the last decade 
(poverty reduction appears to have stalled, while human development indicators 
are markedly worse since 1990), regularizing VAHWs through contractual 
agreements for preventive services with the government and/or NGOs is one 
avenue that should be explored.  However, if political willingness remains weak, 
donors may consider by-passing the government altogether to work directly with 
the poor on their own or through NGOs that have been effective in promoting 
vaccination and animal health services in rural areas, especially as these relate to 
HPAI and FMD prevention. 
 
                                                 
1 This is per Cambodia’s World Trade Organization working party report, adopted on 22 July 2003.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses the potential for pro-poor livestock policies in the context of a 
challenging governance environment. It is a case study of Cambodia where nearly 88% 
of the poor come from rural areas, 80% of the population is rural, and no medium-
term agricultural sector strategy currently exists. Cambodia is one of the least 
developed countries in the world. Between 1975 and 1979 it suffered the loss of an 
estimated 1.7 million people or one quarter of its population—and much of its 
livestock as well. 
Agriculture and livestock represent 46% and nearly seven percent of Cambodia’s 
economy, respectively (1997-2001). There is a consensus that the development of 
agriculture is Cambodia’s best hope for survival in the global economy (Godfrey, 2003; 
World Bank, 2004a; IMF, 2004; RGC, 2004a; Sciaroni, 2004; NGO Forum, 2002) 
following the end of the preferential quotas for the export of garments to the United 
States and the European Union, which had made that industry Cambodia’s largest 
foreign exchange earner. The livestock sub-sector has considerable potential if tapped 
properly, as farming continues to shift from subsistence to commercial agriculture 
over the next decade. 
Donors have only recently realized that agriculture has been inadequately addressed 
for a decade, acknowledging the embarrassing fact that only eight percent of aid has 
gone to the sector. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have tried, with their 
modest resources, to obtain results from the livestock sub-sector. Accordingly, a 
major objective of this paper is to recommend feasible pro-poor livestock (and 
livestock-sector related) policies from the set of options already in existence. 
This paper draws on more than fifty interviews conducted over the course of one year 
with senior policymakers,
2 owners, middle managers,
3 advisors (both national and 
international), and staff of public, private, and tertiary (donor and NGO) sectors. 
These interviews took place without interpreters in the language in which the 
interviewee felt most comfortable (French, Khmer, or English) and notes were usually 
typed-up within 24 hours. In addition, this paper presents a literature review of 
official documents from the government, donor, private sector, and NGO community; 
local newspapers; and recently published research on the livestock sub-sector. Field 
visits to six provinces
4 were conducted. The interviews were free-flowing, guided 
initially only by the Terms of Reference provided for this project by FAO, and tended 
to reflect the subjects’ concerns. The field trips allowed the author to obtain access 
to villagers, including a number of Village Animal Health Workers and commune 
officials, as well as simply to examine conditions on the ground—in fields, feedlots, 
agro-industrial facilities, and even a newly built private port where cattle are 
exported to Malaysia. 
The paper has the following structure: Section 2 provides the political context of the 
paper. It covers political structure and the influence of the military in modern-day 
Cambodia. It goes briefly over the country’s modern political history, the electoral 
system and political base of the three major parties—the Cambodian People’s Party 
(CPP), Funcinpec (a French acronym for the United National Front for an Independent, 
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia), and the Sam Rainsy Party. As such it provides 
the political basis for analysis of pro-poor livestock policy prospects in subsequent 
sections. Current political and institutional processes do not lend much voice to the 
p o o r  b e y o n d  w h a t  i s  s a i d  i n  s p e e c h e s  a n d  w h a t  i s  w r i t t e n  o n  p a p e r .  T h e r e  a r e  
                                                 
2 These were at the level of Secretary of State, Secretary General, and Undersecretary of State. 
3 These were at the level of Team Leaders and Deputy Directors. 
4 Beyond Phnom Penh, these include Kampong Som (Krong Sihanoukville), Koh Kong, Takeo, Kampong Speu, Kampong 
Chhnang, and Kandal provinces. 1. Introduction 
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numerous reasons for this, but the paper focuses on three: (2.1) the legacy of the 
Khmer Rouge; (2.2) patron-client relations and an embedded culture of corruption; 
and (2.3) the Donor-Government Nexus which has produced too many strategies and 
plans, but too few funded mandates and feasible policies. 
Section 3 delves into the economic context. It examines human development 
outcomes, livestock, and agriculture. It begins with human development (3.1) and 
elaboration of estimated increases in poverty and inequality since the late 1990s. It 
goes on to show that illiteracy and child and infant mortality have all increased since 
1990. Section 3.2 discusses agriculture’s contribution to Gross Domestic Product and 
posits that it is the only sector capable of absorbing the 150,000-250,000 entrants 
joining the labor force each year (World Bank, 2005b and Berthiaume, 2005).
5 It ends 
by highlighting the importance of creating a strategic framework for agriculture. 
Livestock (3.3) is explored for its role and gender divisions, livestock lending practices 
are discussed together with a case study of Acleda Bank, Cambodia’s largest 
Microfinance Institution (MFI)-turned commercial bank is examined. The herd is 
detailed as is current evidence on animal drugs and mortality rates.  
Section 4 examines the policy context. It elaborates on sector challenges, the 
feasibility of existing pro-poor livestock strategies and presents several strategic entry 
points. The challenges (4.1) surround markets, access, and land. Pro-poor spending 
leaves much to be desired as will be shown in this section. Current pro-poor livestock 
policies (4.2) are described following a brief overview of the major policy documents. 
The focus is on the basic and smallholder livestock sub-sector strategy introduced four 
years ago. The Strategic Entry Points (4.3) discussed begin with a medium term 
strategy for agriculture set as a benchmark in the 2004 Consultative Group meeting 
Joint Monitoring Indicators. It is argued that the December 2005 completion target 
date offers an important opportunity to emphasize NGO participation and the need for 
animal health be regularized within this policy. A related Strategic Entry Point is 
further donor support to combat Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) by using 
subsidized micro-credit for HPAI-impacted breeders (especially single-women heads of 
households or families without draught labor). Other Strategic Entry Points are the 
export of livestock and the potential for a Foot-and-Mouth Disease Free Zone (4.3), 
and the continued improvement of veterinary service through VAHWs (4.4) by 
regularizing them further through contracting of services either by the government or 
NGOs with donor support. Finally Section 5 concludes the paper by framing the 
opportunities in pro-poor livestock policies while underscoring the constraints of day-
to-day politics in Cambodia. It summarizes the strategic entry points.  
 
                                                 
5 My own calculations based on World Development Indicators 2005 data suggest the figure is closer to 150,000. However, the 
figure of 250,000 is widely used and repeated. Most recently, outgoing US Ambassador Charles Ray said “Every effort has to 
be made to create jobs for as many of those 250,000 people as possible… Not only because it will move the country forward 
if it’s done, it will move the country backwards if it’s not done” (as quoted in Berthiaume, 2005).  
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2. POLITICAL CONTEXT: KHMER ROUGE LEGACY, CORRUPTION  
AND DONOR-GOVERNMENT NEXUS 
Political Structure and Modern History 
Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy with three branches of government (legislative, 
executive, and judicial) in which the King “shall reign but shall not govern” (RGC, 
1999). In the First Mandate (1993-1998) the legislative branch was unicameral with 
only a National Assembly but two Prime Ministers serving jointly. By the Second 
Mandate (1999-2003), it became bicameral, adding a Senate
6 to the already existing 
National Assembly. The Senate is intended to review legislation, but is too often 
merely a rubberstamp, as is the National Assembly. With the formation of the Third 
Mandate in 2004, the Heritage Foundation (2005) called the coalition deal “patronage 
at its worst” with one Prime Minister, seven Deputy Prime Ministers, 15 Senior 
Ministers, 28 Ministers, 135 Secretaries of State, and at least 146 Under-Secretaries of 
State. While the main political parties are discussed in subsequent sections, the army 
is its own power center and merits a brief examination here. 
Since the broad strokes of Cambodian contemporary history are well-known, this 
paper will not delve into them to any great extent beyond the table below, and in the 
subsequent pages. 
Table 1:  Transition of Legal, Political, and Economic Systems in Cambodia. 
Period  Legal System  Political 
System  Political Power  Economic 
System 
Before 1953  
French-based 




Held by the French  Colonial 
1953-1970 
(The Kingdom 
of Cambodia)  
French-based 




Held by King Norodom Sihanouk 
(until he abdicates in 1955) 
then as Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk alternately as Prime 
Minister or Head of State of an 
elected government known as 
the Sangkum Reastr Niyum or 









civil code and 
judiciary 
Republic  Held by Lon Nol and Sirik Matak 














Held by Pol Pot and the Khmer 





                                                 
6 The Senate was created because the head of the National Assembly during the First Mandate had to cede his place to the 
Former First Prime Minister whose party lost the election. 2. Political Context: Khmer Rouge Legacy, Corruption and Donor-government Nexus 
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Period  Legal System  Political 














Held by the Kampuchean 
People’s Revolutionary Party 
which picks Hun Sen as Prime 
Minister beginning in 1985 
(Vietnamese backed with 















Held by Cambodian People’s 
Party (renamed from KPRP) 
with Hun Sen as P.M. 

















which the King 
reigns but does 
not rule 
Shared between Ranariddh 
(Funcinpec) and Hun Sen (CPP) 
in a unique arrangement of co-
Prime Ministers with required 
2/3 supermajority for ruling 
coalition 







As above  As above  Held by Hun Sen as Prime 
Minister in a CPP-Funcinpec 
coalition government that 







Source: Adapted from Wescott (2001) based on Chandler (1991) and Mekong Law Group et al. (1999). 
Note: The 1993-1998 period is often seen as an Emergency Phase, while the 1998-present period is seen as a 
Development Phase. 1998 was the year Pol Pot died, and in 1999 the Khmer Rouge totally disbanded. 
 
Electoral System and Political Base 
Since 1998, Cambodia has used a party list Proportional Representation system
7 that 
favors large parties.
8 This was a desire of the Cambodian People’s Party following the 
“events of 5-6 July 1997” (more on this later) after which it consolidated control over 
the country. The trend since then has been the steady aggregation of seats by the CPP 
despite only modest gains in popular vote.
9 Table shows that while the CPP won 47.3% 
of the vote in 2003, it now holds 73 (or 59%) out of 123 seats in the National Assembly. 
 
                                                 
7 In Party List PR, a seat is awarded for each 1/N of the vote, in an N-seat election. Scheir (1998) offers more detailed 
analysis in the case of Cambodia. 
8 That year, following the events of 5-6 July 1997 (of which more later), Cambodia began using the Jefferson/d’Hondt 
formula which favors the biggest party to the detriment of smaller parties because it rounds down in its allocation formula 
9 The Representative of the Konrad Adenaur Foundation quipped that while Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza once told 
the opposition: "You won the elections. But I won the count," the statement should be re-phrased in Cambodia’s case to "You 
won the elections, but I won by formula" (Scheir, 1998). 2. Political Context: Khmer Rouge Legacy, Corruption and Donor-government Nexus 
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Table 2:   Electoral Shifts 1998-2003 
Party  Votes  %  Change  Seats  Change 
CPP 2,441,578  47.3  (+05.9)  73  (+10) 
Funcinpec 1,070,601  20.8 (-10.9)  26  (-17) 
SRP 1,129,171  21.9  (+07.6)  24  (+08) 
Others 481,456  09.9  -     
Total  5,160,939      123   
Source: National Election Committee (undated). 
 
The political base of the three parties elected to the National Assembly since 1998 
varies according to the depth of each party’s rural political machine (of which the CPP 
has the most extensive network) and political legacy.  
Funcinpec 
Funcinpec is the second largest party in the Third Legislature with 26 seats. Its origins 
are in the resistance movement against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in the 
1980s. It was part of the non-communist resistance, but was in a strategic and military 
alliance with the Khmer Rouge for strategic reasons. Under United Nations 
Transitional Authority (UNTAC) election rules in 1993, Funcinpec was prohibited from 
using the image of His Majesty Norodom Sihanouk because the latter was to be an 
impartial figure above the political fray. Funcinpec however bypassed this small 
inconvenience by using the image of Norodom Ranariddh, its party leader. Ranarridh 
has a remarkable likeness to his father, Sihanouk. "Other parties are offering you 
gifts," Ranariddh has reportedly said, referring to small donations of scarves and 
packets of Monosodium Glutamate (MSG) given by the CPP to supporters, "We are not 
offering you gifts, we are offering you the king."
10 Ranariddh has long stressed the fact 
that Funcinpec was founded by his father shortly after the 1979 Vietnamese invasion 
and that the party has remained steadfastly 'Sihanoukist' even though following the 
2003 election in which Funcinpec lost 17 National Assembly seats and almost 11 
percentage points of support, Ranariddh suggested a merger with the CPP (which the 
latter roundly rejected). 
Sam Rainsy Party 
With 24 seats but more popular votes than Funcinpec, the opposition Sam Rainsy Party 
which takes its moniker from its leader Sam Rainsy, enjoys popularity among urban 
dwellers who oppose the ruling coalition. This includes large numbers of Cambodia’s 
nascent labor union movement. In the First Mandate, Sam Rainsy was a Funcinpec 
Member of Parliament and Finance Minister until his ouster for being too outspoken 
against the interests of a particular oligarch. Rainsy questioned why oligarchs were 
not paying taxes. He introduced 50 auditors in the Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
He took to the streets with a protest for Olympic Market stallholders because of 
alleged unfair increases in rents by the owner, that same oligarch. He was warned 
                                                 
10 As quoted in Torode (1998). 2. Political Context: Khmer Rouge Legacy, Corruption and Donor-government Nexus 
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numerous times by his party boss, Prince Ranariddh, but continued. His approach can 
be caustic in a political environment that values decorum.
11 
Expelled from Funcinpec, Sam Rainsy automatically lost his seat in the National 
Assembly and subsequently founded the Khmer Nation Party (later renamed the Sam 
Rainsy Party).
12 Beyond this, there is an ethnic undertone to Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) 
supporters, for Sam Rainsy’s speeches have frequently invoked the word Yuon, the 
xenonym for Vietnamese in Khmer.
13 This is a sensitive issue due to Vietnam’s rescue 
of Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge in 1979 and subsequent decade-long occupation. 
Due to the CPP’s Vietnamese origins attempts to link the CPP and Hun Sen to his 
former patron, Vietnam (more on this in Section 2.1 on the KR Legacy) are seen by the 
International Community as racist (see BBC, 2005). One of his major pledges is to stop 
illegal immigration from Vietnam, something he insists Hun Sen cannot do (Torode, 
1998). Without any positions in the current government, the SRP has no means of 
financing itself other than by raising money from supporters abroad. Sam Rainsy, along 
with two SRP fellow Members of Parliament were stripped of their immunity on 3 
February 2005 to permit a defamation lawsuit lodged against them by National 
Assembly President, Norodom Ranariddh, to proceed. 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) 
The CPP’s political base is generally seen as coming from outside Phnom Penh. In 
2003, it came in second in the capital with 150,189 votes to the SRP’s 217,663, and 
Funcinpec’s 65,249. Its strength is at the village level, where it exerts greater 
influence on the people through its network of village, district, and commune chiefs 
(the latter were, until 2002, entirely appointed by the CPP). An alleged strategy has 
been intimidation and fear. Politically related killings, almost always of non-CPP 
candidates, are common, though their numbers have seen a secular decline from one 
election to the next.
14 In January 1998, just before the elections when Cambodia’s 
membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was in limbo, Hun 
Sen quipped: "In Brunei, power rests with the monarchy. In Indonesia some 
newspapers that criticized the government were closed. And in Thailand when they 
have an election, it is corrupt. Other things, like economics, they can teach us, but on 
the subject of democracy and human rights, they must not teach us."
15 
The CPP was born of a faction of the Khmer Rouge that defected to Vietnam before 
the latter invaded Cambodia in 1979. The role and influence of Vietnam in Cambodian 
politics predates the 1979 invasion. For the past millennium, Vietnam and Cambodia 
have had land disputes and full-fledged wars because of Vietnamese population 
pressures. As such, Mosyakov (2000:15) argues that “historically Khmers always 
disliked Vietnamese, considering them aggressors in relation to their home country.”  
Politics in Cambodia is predicated on power and money. The ruling party and Prime 
Minister Hun Sen have effectively controlled the country for more than two decades, 
but there is some factionalism. The Prime Minister is not the leader of his own party 
                                                 
11 On 30 March 1997, a protest he led against corruption in the Cambodian judicial system was met with several grenades 
killing 20 and injuring more than 150 (Smith, 1997). 
12 Attempts were made to hijack the Khmer Nation Party (KNP) name by elements inside the KNP allegedly in coordination 
with external interests. With a name like the Sam Rainsy Party, it has thus far been impossible for anyone other than Sam 
Rainsy to claim control of the party. 
13 The word took on a negative connotation in the 1970s and was allegedly banned in the 1980s when Cambodia was occupied 
by Vietnam. Sour Vietnamese soup “samlar machou youn” became “samlar machou Vietnam” but reverted to “samlar 
machou youn” in the 1990s. 
14 In 2002, I calculated the likelihood of random “death” in a Cambodian election based on the likelihood that 18 candidates 
of SRP and Funcinpec (using an urn model with replacement) would die randomly (assuming authorities were right that there 
was absolutely nothing politically motivated about each death and that they were all random) as equal to 1 in 1,478 or a 
0.06% probability. 
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(a case similar to the Communist Party of Vietnam
16), but is vice-chairman of the 
politburo (Standing Committee) and the Central Committee. Hun Sen faction’s 
consolidation of power within the CPP is nearly complete, with most military forces 
near Phnom Penh loyal to him. Most observers infer that the military is the 
fundamental base of Hun Sen’s power. As we shall see this complicates taking 
measures against the military when it acts in ways that make trade in livestock 
products by ordinary Cambodians unprofitable. 
The Primacy of the Military 
While Cambodia enjoys a democratic electoral political process, the role of the 
military in Cambodian politics and the economy should not be underestimated. The 
military has served to integrate various factions’ armies into a national army. Most are 
old members of the communist armed forces dating from the 1980s. In 2001, there 
were officially 129,449 Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) personnel, of whom 
36,052 were commissioned officers including 386 generals (RGC, 2003: 14).
17 The US 
Department of State estimates at most 60,000 members of the armed forces (as of 
1997, see US DoS, 2000: 40), a figure one US Department of State official admitted 
"was put at the top end of the possible range to avoid embarrassing the Cambodian 
government" (as quoted in Adams, 2001). The rest are ghost soldiers or not active, but 
their salaries are paid (circa $20/month)
18 and their supplies provided (then resold or 
never delivered, but invoiced). This suggests that the potential for members of the 
military’s to be involved in illicit activities is high. 
Since 1999, the government has pledged to reduce military spending (officially 20% in 
1998 and 14% in 2002) and increase social sector spending, but budget credibility is 
very weak, and year after year the military exceeds budget allocations while health, 
education and welfare receive less than their budget allocations (Adams, 2001). 
Because of non-transparent parallel budgets, no-one really knows how much is spent 
on defense; one estimate puts it close to $300 million (Richardson, 2005) or almost 
half the official government budget, while another puts it at $112 million in 2001.
19 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) pulled-out in 1997 on the pretext of non-
transparent forestry revenues that were believed to have financed a parallel budget 
for military spending. While it was not the official reason for the IMF’s departure, the 
events of 5-6 July 1997 were an important factor for subsequently poor economic 
performance that served as a pretext. The events underscore the importance of the 
military. 
On 5-6 July 1997, then First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh was ousted from power 
by Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. This resulted in more than 70 extrajudicial killings 
of mostly Funcinpec civilian loyalists. Although the precise details may never come to 
light, the general storyline is that in the lead-up to the events, a power struggle 
between Funcinpec and the CPP emerged in recruiting senior Khmer Rouge defectors. 
This led, for all intents and purposes, to a coup d’etat. Forces loyal to the Second 
Prime Minister launched violent and sustained attacks against forces loyal to the First 
Prime Minister (claiming that the former was ready to take sole power) in Phnom Penh 
                                                 
16 The General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam is Nong Duc Manh, the head of state of Vietnam is President 
Tran Duc Luong, and the Prime Minister is Phan Van Khai. Tran Duc Luong is a member of the Party Central Committee. 
Unlike Cambodia, Vietnam is a one-party state in both theory and practice. According to the amended 1992 Constitution, the 
Communist Party of Vietnam is the “force leading the State and society.” 
17 Commissioned officers include: 386 one to four star generals; 679 colonels; 1,720 lieutenant colonels; and 2,072 were 
majors. Other commissioned officers (Captains, First Lieutenants, Second Lieutenants, and Sergeant Majors) totalled 31,195. 
See RGC (2003: 14). 
18 This paper uses an exchange rate of 4,000 Riels for US$1. 
19 According to official government statistics, overall expenditure on defense and security decreased 2.4% from 417 billion 
Riels ($104 million) or 2.9% of GDP in 2001 to 407 billion Riels ($101.8 million) or 2.6% of GDP. Expenditure by Ministry of 
National Defense decreased 4.3% from 277 billion Riels ($69 million) in 2001 to 265 billion Riels ($66 million) in 2002 (RGC, 
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and the surrounding area (Amnesty International, 1997). To preserve the semblance of 
normalcy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, who belonged 
to Funcinpec, was named First Prime Minister. In the aftermath of 1997, there was no 
doubt who called the shots, and the entire military landscape has shifted as a result. 
The primacy of the military in usurping democratic rule and Hun Sen’s consolidation of 
military power was complete. 
Political Prospects 
Politically, there is no alternative other than to work within the system if donors insist 
on dealing with the government. Some have refused. The US Congress does not allow 
any US funds to go directly to the Cambodian government, mandating that funds 
instead go through NGOs. How Cambodia evolved into its current political 
arrangement is debatable. Certainly, three factors that feature prominently are: (2.1) 
the legacy of the Khmer Rouge; (2.2) patron-client relations and an embedded culture 
of corruption; and (2.3) the evolving relationship between donors and the government 
are crucial factors. Each is elaborated in the following three sections. 
2.1 The Legacy of the Khmer Rouge 
The political economy of Cambodia has seen tumultuous changes since the country 
achieved independence in 1953. Among these, the Khmer Rouge period was the most 
devastating, killing 1.7 million or a quarter of the population. Coined from the French 
by Cambodia’s then Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, to describe the maquis 
(originally only leftists intellectuals) as “Red Khmer” or “Red Cambodians,” the Khmer 
Rouge ruled Democratic Kampuchea (DK), a totalitarian regime, from 1975 until 1979 
(Ear and Ear, forthcoming). As Short (2004: 12) has argued, “Individual rights were not 
curtailed in favor of the collective, but extinguished altogether. Individual creativity, 
initiative, and originality were condemned per se. Individual consciousness was 
systematically demolished.” As will be clear, a large part of this legacy shapes the 
current regime’s thinking and the manner in which it behaves. Indeed, the current 
regime credits itself with having vanquished the Khmer Rouge threat and brought 
stability to Cambodia. It is a shadow from which Cambodia has yet to emerge. While 
an international tribunal will take place, many have argued that impunity will always 
prevail as long as the Khmer Rouge leaders escape justice. 
In this context, what would become the CPP was a faction of the Khmer Rouge that 
defected to Vietnam after relentless purges of the Eastern Zone of DK by the Pol Pot 
faction.
20 In 1978 Hun Sen and Chea Sim (Chairman of the CPP) became founding 
members of the Vietnamese-sponsored United Front for the National Salvation of 
Kampuchea (UFNSK) that became the communist Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary 
Party. Heading the UFNSK was Heng Samrin (now Honorary President of the CPP), 
formerly the fifth highest ranking Khmer Rouge official in the Eastern Zone and among 
the 14 original founders of UFNSK, the most senior official in the Khmer Rouge military 
hierarchy (Jennar, 1995: 203-204). The CPP top leadership thus comes from the lower 
echelons of the pre-1977 Khmer Rouge movement and has yet to reconcile itself with 
this chapter of its history. Attempts to frame it in terms of divisions (two types of 
Khmer Rouge: (1) cruel Pol Potist faction; (2) adherents of humane Vietnamese-style 
socialism) have met with only moderate success. Post-KR Cambodia was reconstructed 
against this backdrop, a country some would say is at war with its own legacy. 
                                                 
20 The Eastern Zone is where many of the original members of the faction first hailed. 2. Political Context: Khmer Rouge Legacy, Corruption and Donor-government Nexus 
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After the Khmer Rouge: Livestock and the Failure Collectivization 
In the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979, the 
new government, composed primarily of former Khmer Rouge officers who had 
defected to Vietnam by 1977, pursued agricultural collectivization. Livestock itself 
was nearly decimated during the Khmer Rouge period. It is believed to have suffered 
heavy casualties during the period of US bombings in the early 1970s.
21 In the period 
immediately after the Khmer Rouge, livestock was so scarce for draught power that it 
is said that no animal less than three years old could be killed for meat according to a 
livestock professional (52).
22 Extreme agro-communism had been an unmitigated 
disaster under the Khmer Rouge, and this quickly failed in this period as well (Frings, 
1993). The authorities soon relaxed implementation (Chandler, 1991).  
The experience of the Khmer Rouge period made vigorous pursuit of such policies 
unpalatable to a traumatized people and has poisoned their view of collectives to this 
day. François Ponchaud, whose book Cambodia: Year Zero was the first to document 
Khmer Rouge atrocities, recently remarked “In the early ‘90s, Cambodians reacted 
negatively to any collective work, because of the Khmer Rouge.”
23 When he attempted 
to get villagers to rehabilitate old irrigation canals first built by the Khmer Rouge 
during the 2004 drought, a Village Chief told him “We don’t want them, that’s the 
work of the Khmer Rouge, the ideology of the past.”
24  
When explaining the need for farmers’ collective action a senior government official 
(40) shied away from using the word Sahakum “commune” and even the politically 
correct term Sahakaw or “cooperative” (which gained popularity during the People's 
Socialist Community period of 1955-1970) for fear of their historical connotations. 
While he agrees that it will be essential to develop cooperatives to aggregate 
smallholder power,
25 he also knows that Cambodia has gone from one extreme—Maoist 
agro-communism—to another extreme—free-for-all oligarch or “Oknha” capitalism 
without a safety net of any significance (Chan and Ear, 2004). Collective action, 
whether through cooperatives or associations, is now more important than ever. It is 
well-known that grass-roots associations and institutions have been far and few 
according to a livestock NGO head (33), a livestock professional (35), and a senior 
government official (40). A livestock project team leader (43) argued that pushing for 
cooperatives and associations was simply too soon after the Khmer Rouge trauma to 
be effective: “Farmers are barely able to feed themselves as it is; how can they think 
of a surplus?”  
Cambodia has low social capital as a result of the Vietnam War and the Khmer Rouge 
period in particular. Colleta and Cullen (2000) argue that the Cambodian genocide 
destroyed social capital, but that social capital of a familial nature endured during the 
                                                 
21 Caldwell (1979) wrote that during the Khmer Rouge period "Meat eating was boosted by countering Buddhist reluctance to 
take life and by encouraging the raising and slaughtering of livestock, particularly pigs (... "pork is allotted on the basis of 
one pig every two weeks for each production solidarity group of ten people.")" Caldwell was an unabashed supporter of the 
Khmer Rouge revolution. In 1978, he was invited to visit Democratic Kampuchea and was killed by an unknown assassin in 
1978 after interviewing Pol Pot in Phnom Penh. 
22 Please see Annex for coded table as well as individuals list. 
23 As quoted in AFP (2005b). 
24 Ibid. 
25 At the 2002 CG, the Government included “Establish Agricultural Cooperatives Donors Sought; Feasibility Study Required; 
2002-2004 $105,000 requested” but was not funded. While this paper will not delve into details of the current cooperative 
situation in Cambodia, there is some encouraging news about their progress. On 21 December 2004, the Cambodian Farmer 
Assembly (CFA), described by members as a kind of "National Assembly for farmers", was officially formed in Kampong Cham. 
The CFA arose out of the System of Rice Intensification “movement”. The CFA has 2,000 farmers in 10 provinces and expects 
to establish 5,000 associations, each with 15-40 members, by 2010. However Vong (2004) noted: “A call to the relevant 
ministry gives little confidence in top officials helping poor rural communities. Chan Tong Iv, Secretary of State for the 
Ministry of Agriculture, said he has not heard about the recent formation of the Cambodian Farmer Assembly. ‘I do not know 
and I do not understand about their target,’ said Tong Iv.” 2. Political Context: Khmer Rouge Legacy, Corruption and Donor-government Nexus 
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conflict, providing a basic survival-oriented safety net.
26 They argue that during the 
Lon Nol regime “traditional sources of social capital were severely eroded throughout 
Cambodia. Many villages were forced to relocate or split due to warfare, bombings 
and Lon Nol recruitment.” (2000: 19). These traditional sources of social capital would 
have come from associations with professional or developmental objectives, such as 
rice banks, funeral associations, and water users groups (Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 
2002). Following the period of conflict, associations started to increase in number and 
intensity but they still are not as common as they once were. Senior government 
officials (40 & 48) and a multilateral donor official (25) widely acknowledged however 
that these issues of trust and social capital remain. As Martin and McLeod (1994) have 
argued, Cambodian society was shattered during the Khmer Rouge period. This may 
partly explain why corruption and patronage is so often described as systematic in 
Cambodia. 
As the World Trade Organization’s newest member,
27 Cambodia has the right to 
challenge other members if it believes their trade practices violate WTO rules. 
However, it will need to pick and choose its battles. A WTO Business Guide produced 
by the Ministry of Commerce and the Mekong Project Development Facility (MPDF) 
points out “Complaints made by entire manufacturing or farming sectors will carry the 
most weight in Phnom Penh. This is one reason why the formation of trade 
associations will be especially important for the private sector to recognize the full 
potential of WTO membership” (MoC and MPDF, 2005: 8). The process has started, but 
expectations should be realistic.
28 
Landmines and Low Human Capital 
Cambodia remains one of the countries most affected by landmines and unexploded 
ordnances (UXOs) in the world. It is estimated that one out of every 245 individuals is 
an amputee (UNPAN, 2003: 26). The consequences to livestock have been severe, 
though no statistics are available. In 2002, a survey estimated that 2.5% (4,466 square 
km) of the country's surface area is contaminated by mines or UXOs, reducing arable 
land. Twelve percent (1,640) of all villages have to cope with levels of high 
contamination by landmines, and more than 5,500 villages have UXOs scattered on 
their land (RGC, 2004b: 56). 
The disastrous consequences of the Khmer Rouge period on the human resources of 
the country are well known (Fujii and Ear, 2002). Wearing glasses was a sign of 
bourgeois intellectualism, and reason for death (Ngor with Warner, 2003). Illiteracy 
stands at 63%, and both infant and child mortality are some of the highest in the 
region (more in 3.1). One of the few veterinarians who survived through the 1970s to 
return to Cambodia now serves as a livestock professional (46). He was among the 
lucky ones who did not come back to Cambodia in 1975, like so many others lured by 
the Khmer Rouge to rebuild the nation, only to be slaughtered. He was in France in 
1974, and stayed there until deciding to come work for FAO in 2003. He estimates that 
                                                 
26 One might posit that a continuing symptom of the survival of “social capital of a familial nature” from the Khmer Rouge 
period is the very familial nature of patronage and corruption now observed in Cambodia. It is not uncommon to see the 
insertion of family members at all levels of governments, from the driver to the chief of staff. No job is too high or too low 
to be above familial patronage. 
27 Joining the WTO is only the latest move in a string of moves to integrate Cambodia into the International Community. 
Cambodia formally joined the WTO in 2004 after an 11 month delay in forming a government following national elections in 
2003. Having been denied international recognition as a “pariah state” throughout the 1980s, after Vietnam invaded and 
occupied the country in 1979, it was in the post-1993 period that Cambodia re-emerged internationally. Until then, 
Cambodia’s seat at the UN had been held by the Khmer Rouge in a coalition with the non-communist resistance. In 1999, it 
acceded to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which also meant joining the ASEAN Free Trade Area when the 
latter comes into effect in 2015. Since 2004, the country has aimed for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, arguing 
that its time had come. 
28 The only time Cambodia ever risked not joining an international grouping was during the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 2004 
when it declared that if Europe refused to permit Myanmar to join, it would not participate either as a show of solidarity. In 
the end, Myanmar was not barred, and Cambodia was not obliged to exercise its threat. 2. Political Context: Khmer Rouge Legacy, Corruption and Donor-government Nexus 
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today, competent veterinarians who have received training of an international caliber 
number less than 10 nationwide.
29  
2.2 Patron-Client Relations and Embedded Culture of Corruption  
Patron-client systems have ruled social relations in peasant societies since time 
immemorial, and Cambodia is no exception. The Leninist structure of the governing 
party and the highly hierarchical cultural traditions of the country make Cambodia 
particularly susceptible to top-down governance. From at least the time of the 
Sangkum Reastr Niyum period, his Majesty Norodom Sihanouk took on the French 
nickname “papa” or in Khmer “Samdech Euv” (Father Lord). The population of 
Cambodia was considered his children. Corruption, which feeds into patron-
clientelism, has a long recorded history. Cambodian folktales from the turn-of-the-
century published by the Buddhist Institute tell of a “Judge Rabbit” who took bribes to 
decide cases. Titles are extremely important, as for example the Prime Minister 
happens to have been given the royal title “Samdech” or “Lord”
30 by the King-Father 
in 1993 and all mid-to-senior level officials are called “Ayadom” or “Excellency” while 
certain oligarchs who have donated at least $100,000 to public charitable causes may 
receive the title of “Oknha”, of which there is an elite level that only a few accede to 
called “Neak Oknha”. 
Visualizing politics in Cambodia as a pyramid, in which an all-powerful Prime Minister 
sits at the top has its allure. As a formal structure, the civil service has been 
described by a senior member of the government as a “pyramid, with an apex and a 
base but nothing in between. Because of their low salaries, the crucial middle-level 
people must work outside in order to survive” (as quoted in Godfrey et al. 2002: 365). 
A deputy director of a Ministerial department currently receives 150,000 Riels or 
$37.50 per month according to an MAFF official (44). Naturally, the politics of 
patronage has itself made corruption the sine qua non of survival in Cambodia. Sath 
Sophal of government-owned Agence Khmer Press, who admits receiving handouts 
from his patrons (government officials) at media events, said “I don't think it is 
corruption or bribery; it is a case of understanding each other about difficult living 
conditions.”
31 Technocrats who propose policies that fail to take into account systemic 
corruption are likely to be disappointed by their outcomes. 
Fighting Corruption, Fighting Corruption, Fighting Corruption 
These are the three problems Cambodia faces according to World Bank President, 
James Wolfensohn. He visited in February 2005 for an international conference on 
“Seizing the Global Opportunity”.
32 Cambodia’s business environment has also been 
characterized as unpredictable and arbitrary because of crippling levels of corruption. 
A study of 800 private sector firms throughout the country by the World Bank (2004b) 
                                                 
29 Desvaux (2004: 16) writes that only four DAHP staff members have Master’s degrees from abroad, of whom two are Deputy 
Directors. Many however hold the degree of Doctor of Veterinary Medicine which would have been acquired at the Royal 
University of Agriculture, Chamcar Daung. 
30 This appeared to have been an attempt at national reconciliation. Sihanouk also called Hun Sen his “son”. Heng Samrin and 
Chea Sim, honorary president of the CPP and chairman of the CPP, respectively, were also given Samdech titles. 
31 As quoted in PPP (2000-2001). 
32 He also said: “If you decide not to move, no one will cry over Cambodia. It is up to you and the world is watching … If you 
do not become a credible competitor, it will be because of Cambodians, not because of the international community ... You 
have confusing bureaucratic practices, you have too many approvals, you have too many steps and every step is an 
opportunity for corruption … We need to simplify procedures and we need to make sure there is no illegal payment on the 
way” (as quoted in Ek, 2005 and BBC, 2005). The cost of shipping a container to the United States from Cambodia, whose 
major foreign exchange earner by far is garments, was $1,000 more than from China. It was a sentiment that was echoed by 
all of the speakers, including the former European Union trade commissioner Pascal Lamy (BBC, 2005). This, along with the 
frequently expressed concerns of other donors like DFID who commissioned the report by Hughes and Conway (2004) and 
specifically asked them to think outside the box, shows that frustration with Cambodia’s governance situation has hit an all-
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revealed that 76% of the firms surveyed identify at least some of the laws and 
regulations affecting them as “unpredictable”. The report also found that 80% of 
sampled firms acknowledged having to pay bribes, while 71% of large firms had to 
make frequent unofficial payments. The report calculated the so-called bribe tax to 
be 5.2% of total sales revenue, although the term was changed to “unofficial 
payments” throughout the main text before publication.
33  
No reliable estimates of corruption exist, but the same report (World Bank, 2004b) 
proffered $120 million. Calavan et al. (2004) writing for the United States Agency for 
International Development estimated between $300-500 million, which could be as 
much 12.5%. Their report was entirely descriptive. As a caveat, the World Bank report 
acknowledges that “Government officials argue that this unofficial payment is likely 
to include all the costs of intermediaries/facilitators often employed by the private 
sector to go through regulatory processes.” This in turn raises “the governance issue 
both within the public and private sectors” and necessitates that both “be addressed 
simultaneously”.
34 This would seem to present a prisoner’s dilemma for reform. What 
can help explain this? The loss of human and social capital explored earlier is a major 
factor. 
Indeed, corruption and patronage are important because there is very little in the way 
of other social organization on which to ground coherent political organization.
35 Thus 
leaders use "direct material inducements" because the post-Khmer Rouge, post-
Vietnam occupation has left them with little or no "normative inducements" on which 
to call and very little in the way of interest group organization either. These would 
permit indirect material inducements and service to a larger—even if selfish—
conception of the public good. The informal networks of patronage identified in 
Hughes and Conway (2004) have weaved together to form a governing coalition for 
Cambodia that requires potentially huge sums to operate and remain in power.
36 One 
former senior government official (8) suggested that donors help the government 
undertake electoral finance reform to reduce the political party machines’ 
consumption of cash for elections (gifts of scarves and packets of MSG do add-up). 
Unfortunately the donors he approached were not interested. According to a bilateral 
donor official (58), it is well known that donors shy away from all things political, 
though this is changing.
37 
Decentralized Corruption 
Cambodia’s internationally-acclaimed experiment with local governance, which has 
been called decentralization, although it is in fact administrative decentralization or 
deconcentration,
38 bore fruit in 2002, when commune elections were held.
39 While all 
communes had been controlled by the CPP, now only close to 99% are under its 
                                                 
33 The find and replace feature missed (perhaps intentionally) one instance on page 110. 
34 See World Bank (2004b: iv, fn 6). 
35 I am grateful to David Leonard for this particular point. 
36 The politics of gift-giving in Cambodia is explored in Hughes (forthcoming). 
37 The former senior government official (8) also told his superiors that the country would benefit from conflict resolution 
through a provincial network of Ombudsman’s offices. Unfortunately, they were not interested in this suggestion either. 
38 According to Ribot (2001: v): “Deconcentration or administrative decentralization concerns transfers of power to local 
branches of the central state, such as prefects, administrators, or local technical line ministry agents. These upwardly 
accountable bodies are appointed local administrative extensions of the central state. They may have some downward 
accountability built into their functions, but their primary responsibility is to central government. Generally, the powers of 
deconcentrated units are delegated by the supervising ministries. Deconcentration is a ‘weak’ form of decentralization 
because the downward accountability relations from which many benefits are expected are not as well-established as in 
democratic or political forms of decentralization.” See also Leonard (1982). 
39 It was the UN project Cambodia Area Rehabilitation and Regeneration (CARERE) that became the Royal Government’s Seila 
program (massively funded by donors), which ostensibly led to commune elections. Both have enjoyed the same American 
Chief Technical Advisor for more than a decade. 2. Political Context: Khmer Rouge Legacy, Corruption and Donor-government Nexus 
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control, and much less than that if counting the number of seats on the councils won 
by non-CPP parties. 
While one would expect bottom-up forces to reach the nodes, elected commune 
councils are essentially disempowered, with neither the power to make major 
decisions nor the purse strings to implement them. Indeed “the goals of the 
government and the international community are not aligned on this. The 
international community repeats their good governance mantra, but the government, 
if you are listening carefully, is talking about peace, stability, and control (emphasis 
added).”
40 The warning signs were already there. Mark Turner’s “Whatever happened 
to Deconcentration? Recent Initiatives in Cambodia” warned that:  
While it is possible to secure greater participation and partnership with local 
communities through deconcentration, it will be problematic to make this a reality. 
Cambodian social structures and history are not conductive to such developments. 
Relations between government and society have been hierarchical. (Turner, 2002: 363) 
Moreover, Cambodian-style decentralization is such that the link between the central 
government and its local branches is not always clear. Pockets of power, quasi-
fiefdoms, exist in which the provincial departments of ministries extract unofficial 
payments from smallholders and of course pay a share to the provincial governor, 
police and to their superiors in the central government, according to a private sector 
manager (1). A team leader (19) who heads an education project called it 
“decentralized corruption” which he considered more equitable than the centralized 
variety. 
Unofficial Payments in Livestock 
Measures that cut into these revenues must be compensated in kind. The only 
exception is if the Minister or better yet the Prime Minister makes noises, but even 
this has its limits; his threats can go only so far, since living conditions are very 
difficult under the political economy of civil wages in Cambodia. Juxtaposed against 
the grand total of $120-500 million per year, this petty corruption (which likely 
accounts for only a fraction) pales in comparison.
41 Moreover, while the army and 
police may have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, they are also freelancers 
when far from the center. Hence, a provincial governor once was asked to stop trucks 
smuggling cattle out of Cambodia and answered: “What will you give me if I do this? I 
need to make as much as what I’m getting from that truck.”
42  
According to a private sector manager (1), the unofficial payments breakdown when a 
cow is sold by the villager which he must then pay as a buyer is reportedly: 
•  10,000 Riels ($2.5) for the chief of commune 
•  15,000 Riels for the veterinarian (government official who clears) 
•  10,000 Riels for governor of the province 
•  3,000 Riels for the police 
•  3,000 Riels for the military police 
 
With a price of 3,500 Riels per kilo, that cost is 5.8% of a 200kg animal, which is in the 
upper range of animals purchased, while on the lower range, at 100kg, it would be 
twice as much or 11.6% per head. 
                                                 
40 Development professional (18). 
41 One is reminded of the African proverb: “Fish rots from the head.” 
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Indeed, the 5.8% figure approximates the 5.2% unofficial payments rate in Cambodia 
that World Bank (2004b) reported. However, given rural-urban income differences, 
while the share may be smaller, rural incomes are considerably lower (this is clear 
from urban-rural poverty figures since most of the poor live in rural areas). Indeed, 
CSD (2005) finds that urban households spend more than twice as much of their total 
expenditure on bribery as their rural counterparts while World Bank (2000) found that 
rural Cambodians spent proportionally more on bribes. How does the process work for 
the payments? Sellers need a letter (sambot) from the authorities proving the 
provenance of the cattle, its specifics (age, owned by whom, etc.) and permission for 
the transport/sale. “One trick favored by thieves, particularly in the north and 
northwest of the country, is to obtain a letter from provincial authorities permitting 
the transport of livestock for slaughter in Phnom Penh” (Hunt, 2004). The following 
box draws from a Draft Survey Report on the Issues and Recommendations of the 
Government Private Sector Forum (GPSF) Agro Business & Agro Processing (ABAP) 
Working Group in 2004. It explains the intricacies of how unofficial fees are collected.  
Paying Your Dues 
The number of payments made to the authorities indicates unnecessary 
levels of bureaucracy that, from an agro business and agro processing 
working group perspective, are costly to maintain.  
The private sector identified different authorities collecting toll fees on 
National Roads. “Many unofficial fees are charged (please refer to the 
six points below) for buying and transporting cattle from the provinces 
to Phnom Penh. In addition there are additional charges in Phnom Penh 
for transporting cattle. In each province transporting costs and 
administrative charges are paid to the Governors office, veterinarian, 
economic police (the economic police have many different levels 
Ministerial level, provincial level, district level), the Livestock office 
(i.e. in two provinces in Kampong Thom and Ratnankiri), other police 
(e.g. military police). The military and economic police stand at many 
points along the roads that are used to transport cattle to Phnom Penh. 
All police fees are unofficial. There is no receipt given.” Kratie, 
Transport sector. On a barge leading from Kratie to Phnom Penh, it was 
noted that at Chhloung “…five different groups: a) provincial economic 
police, b) ministerial economic police, c) district police, d) military 
police, and e) veterinarian extracted a fee” To clear the port when this 
same vessel arrives in Phnom Penh it was estimated that the company 
has to pay the following, “…veterinarian - Riel 70,000, municipal 
economic police - Riel 30,000, military police - Riel 50,000, port 
authority - Riel 70,000.” On leaving the Port of Phnom Penh it was 
suggested that a further five payments had to be made before the truck 
had arrived at the official toll road on Route Number 4. Kratie, 
Transport sector. 
Source: GPSF-ABAP (2004). 
 
A private sector manager (1) complained about excessive informal payments. For a 
330km stretch of road, he reported having to give his truck drivers carrying livestock 
$100 cash (with five to 10 cattle on board, worth $200 each, the load value would be 
five to 10%) in order to pass through (mostly) illegal checkpoints manned by military 
and police authorities. The WTO Business Guide reports that one “consignment of 
cattle, collected from various locations, was subject to 19 stops by the police and 2. Political Context: Khmer Rouge Legacy, Corruption and Donor-government Nexus 
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military and a total fee collection of $250” (MoC and MPDF, 2005: 61). When another 
consignment had too much trouble traveling by road, the buyer used his barge from 
Kratie province. Police speedboats chased the barge demanding payments according 
to a bilateral donor official (58). 
While outright confiscation is out of the question, knowing the cargo is livestock, the 
authorities can cause a delay of a few hours in the searing sun which guarantees its 
expiration. In contrast, So Vitou, the chief of the local Department of Animal Health 
and Production (DAHP) office in Kampot Province, reported that “[Cattle rustlers] 
ha ve  o p e ned  fi r e  a t my  o ffi ci a ls  w he n t hey attempted to stop the trucks carrying 
cattle… When they are stopped, the thieves maintain they are royal military officers 
and intimidate the police into letting them pass.”
43 Rustlers wore RCAF uniforms and 
their vehicles had military license plates (Hunt, 2004). Consignments, unfortunately, 
cannot be entrusted to police or military protection since these appear to be involved 
on both sides of the fence: smuggling or illegal checkpoints. One would need to 
compare the situation prior to decentralization initiatives, but clearly the lack of 
resources, the low pay, and the inability or unwillingness of Phnom Penh to project its 
power and influence over provincial offices suggests that the latter has ceded some 
measure of control over the provincial offices in exchange for payments. These 
payments do not have to flow from the provincial level to the center physically, they 
can merely support the absence or reduction of flows from the center back to the 
provinces (see Section 4 on Policy Context for suggestive evidence). Thus, a volatile 
mix of patronage and corruption now permeates the Cambodian economy.
44  
 
2.3 The Donor-Government Nexus in Cambodia 
Donors, like governments, have bureaucratic processes which make them behave in 
less than productive ways, but which make perfect sense in terms of internal 
organizational logic. And like governments, they also cannot be expected to change 
their behavior unless it is incentive compatible to do so. While government ownership 
and commitment is a problem, a multilateral donor official (42) pointed out that 
donor ownership is itself absent. For a decade, the international community cut 
Cambodia considerable slack, perhaps feeling sorry for its terrible past. This year, the 
World Bank and other donors drew the proverbial line. Donors have helped to fund 
countless government strategies (donors don’t call them their own strategies for 
obvious reasons, unless it really is their own internal strategy), and government has 
taken-up donor-initiated strategies and made them their own, at least on paper, 
creating a mélange of strategies and plans replete with enough flights of rhetoric to 
last decades. 
Too Many Strategies and Plans, Too Few Funded Mandates and Feasible 
Policies 
The result has been a welter of plans and strategies which, one by one, fell to the 
way-side. In the course of the past three years, three national plans and strategies 
have been introduced for the country’s development and poverty reduction: (1) the 
Socio-Economic Development Plan II (SEDPII), (2) the National Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (NPRS), and (3) the Rectangular Strategy (RS). All can be said to be the 
government’s but at least one came from donor requirements and another was more 
or less completed with donor TA. SEDPII was completed with technical assistance from 
                                                 
43 As quoted in Hunt (2004). 
44 If this is to change, the change itself will have to come from within. A government advisor (45) and a senior government 
official (54) agree that it may take at least the current generation before things improve. The comparison was to late 19th 
century America (government advisor, 45). 2. Political Context: Khmer Rouge Legacy, Corruption and Donor-government Nexus 
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the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and released in 2002.
45 The NPRS was required by 
the World Bank and IMF for the country to receive concessional lending and was 
initiated in 2000 as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Finally, the RS is the 
government’s own strategic initiative released in 2004. Next is the National Strategic 
Development Plan (NSDP) which will supersede both SEDPII and NPRS. While the 
circular announcing its launch calls for “realistic”, “government-led and-owned”, and 
“feasible” (RGC, 2005: 1-2) policies, one bilateral donor official (49) warned that the 
NSDP was a donor-driven idea from the beginning. The policy process is opaque, as 
elsewhere, and one may even wonder what policy means in Cambodia. 
In the Realm of Policy: Theory and Practice 
There are at least three types of policy pronouncements in Cambodia. (1) The “policy” 
speech; (2) The Strategy and/or Plan (of which technically there are two sub-types, 
funded or unfunded), and (3) an actual Prakas (ministerial declaration), Sarachor 
(circular), Anukret (sub-decree) issued by the Council of Minister, or Chhbab (law) 
passed by the National Assembly. One would think that the order of importance might 
be (3), (2), and (1), but this is not entirely clear. The policy speech has the least 
significance in terms of the long run. It can stop Karaoke bars for a few weeks or 
months or even make illegal checkpoints disappear temporarily, but they invariably 
come back. The Strategy/Plan is more significant admittedly, but it is often times 
more like a wish list, and certainly the unfunded wish list has much less influence than 
the funded one.
46 Finally, while actual legislation should mean something, it is not 
necessarily the case. These are regularly violated or ignored the further one moves 
from Phnom Penh, as earlier explained. If and when these policies become law, their 
enforcement is an entirely different matter.  
In theory, the general policy process originates in the department of a concerned 
ministry and moves-up via the Under-Secretary of State in charge (policy maker), then 
the Secretary of State (policy maker), then the Minister (decision maker), whereupon 
it can become a Prakas (regulation). If the policy is nationwide and/or impacts 
policies beyond the Ministry’s control, then it must go to the Council of Ministers 
where it is reviewed and signed by the Prime Minister and countersigned by the 
relevant line Minister (Oberndorf, 2004: 9).  
How livestock policies come about in Cambodia has already been the subject of 
considerable scrutiny by Sen (2003b). Based on his workflow diagrams, pro-poor 
livestock policy is highly centralized and top-down. While the conclusion by Sen, who 
is a Deputy Director in the Department of Animal Health and Production in the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry (MAFF), is that pro-poor stakeholders 
need to interact at a level beyond the DAHP, say at the policymaker level which would 
start with an Undersecretary of State, this is an indication of the political reality of 
his own department and the lack of power he exerts beyond it—meaning while he no 
doubt supports the policies, he cannot make the necessary changes as a technocrat.
47 
As such, it speaks to the impotence of the current policy process and, to some extent, 
                                                 
45 In 2002-2003, I worked with an international consultant in East Timor whose job had been to help Cambodia write the 
SEDPII. He became so disillusioned by the process that he never finished the work and chose to leave early. He just did not 
see the point of writing a beautiful document devoid of any political reality, commitment, or acceptance. 
46 The 2004 CG produced the following Pipeline-High Priority Projects on Agricultural Productivity: 
(1) Artificial insemination cattle breeding station (MAFF) Donors Sought; Feasibility Study Required 2005-2006: $91,000 
requested; (2) Hemorrhagic septicemia vaccine production (MAFF) Donors Sought; Feasibility Study Required 2005-2007: 
$400,000 requested; (3) Reduce Mortality and Morbidity of Livestock through strengthening veterinary services and disease 
prevention programs (MAFF) Donors Sought; Feasibility Study Required 2005-2007: $480,000 requested. Only (3) is new, while 
(1) and (2) appeared in the 2002 CG and were left unfunded. The 2002 CG also included Vaccines, Medicines & Equipment 
Donors Sought; Feasibility Study Required 2002-2003: $221,000 requested. 
47 And as we have seen already, even if the changes were made, it would not guarantee any outcomes. 2. Political Context: Khmer Rouge Legacy, Corruption and Donor-government Nexus 
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of policies themselves.
48 Despite this sobering assessment, some secular trends have 
appeared on the horizon, and these may further guide policy options. 
Donor-Government Trends 
There are two discernable domestic trends which tie into the Donor-Government 
Nexus: (1) The government and donors have recently realized that up to half of all aid 
has gone to Technical Assistance (TA) in the last decade, but even before this 
realization, TA that used loan resources became relatively unwelcome (this ties into 
capacity development and VAHWs). (2) Bureaucratic sprawl within ministries and 
inter-ministerial turf-wars have led to strange outcomes even when the Ministers are 
from the same faction of the ruling party. This is a lesson in never underestimating 
the potential for increasing informal payments no matter how illogical these may be. 
Technical Assistance vs. Capacity Development 
An emerging complaint from the few in government who dare to speak-up has been 
the “mountain of reports” and the “cut-and-paste”
49 consultants who offer nothing 
new in terms of high-level policy advice but whose English is “beautiful”.
50 By overly 
relying on TA, capacity development is sacrificed at the altar of expediency: “The 
beleaguered people at the top think short-term and use [Technical Assistance] experts 
to do the job, rather than for capacity development” (Godfrey et al. 2002: 365). As a 
result, one trend has been the desire of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to 
not borrow for TA, and while capacity building is often a long-term goal of TA, the 
two are often billed (rightly or wrongly) as flipsides of the same coin. These are things 
MEF considers soft, unlike a bridge or a road which can effectively be used once built. 
Thus a livestock professional (21) claimed that the International Fund for Agriculture 
and Development (IFAD) was dissuaded from further investing in the training of VAHWs 
as a result of the MEF’s distaste for TA in the form of loans.
51  
This contradicted a multilateral donor official’s (57) view that training was not out as 
an activity for which the government was willing to borrow. TA proper was out, but 
training of civil servants was not. Indeed, both individuals may have been right, since 
VAHWs are not civil servants. Alternatively, this could have been a case of throwing 
the baby out with the bathwater. Training of VAHWs could have been mistaken for yet 
more TA, something that is not hard to do given that 40-50% of aid is technical 
cooperation, a codeword for TA. The IMF (2004) sounded the alarm recently: 
Although weak administrative capacity may have required that about 40-50 percent of all 
aid flows be used for technical cooperation (of which a large part was spent for payments 
of salaries of expatriates) until now, such allocation may not be appropriate in the period 
ahead as Cambodia enters a new phase of reconstruction. Moreover, the enormous 
investment needs of the agricultural sector argue for sharper focus on building simple 
infrastructure rather than for more studies and reviews, except where there is clearly a 
need. 
                                                 
48 The fact that he has chosen to take an advisor position (one of dozens, perhaps even hundreds) with a particularly 
powerful Deputy Prime Minister, which occupy him outside the department while he concurrently but only nominally holds 
his job as Deputy Director, shows the constraints (inside) and opportunities (outside) he faces. 
49 This is a facsimile of Leonard’s and Marshall’s (1982) concept of the “international aid merchant” updated for the Digital 
Age. 
50 Kate (2004) was quoting Secretary of State for the Ministry of Commerce, Sok Siphana, who has been a champion of 
Cambodia’s entry into WTO.  
51 Indeed, there is precious little now taking place in this realm that is not grant-based. Donors involved with DAHP, from FAO 
(HPAI project), the French Authorities (who fund Advisors), to the European Commission (Livestock project that is starting-
up) are all grant-based now. 2. Political Context: Khmer Rouge Legacy, Corruption and Donor-government Nexus 
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Others realize all too well that donors naturally reach for TA in a poor governance 
environment where the risk of corruption in procurement is significant. It is easier for 
donors to pay an international consultant (better yet a national of that donor’s 
country) a large salary that can run up to $15,000 per month in order to further “study 
and review” than to actually bother to build “simple infrastructure” when such 
infrastructure is rife with lucrative procurement opportunities.
52 In addition, when it is 
applied to procurement in project management units and project implementation 
units, TA promotes “bureaucratic hygiene” and controls corruption by creating a layer 
of international auditors and public financial management specialists. A shrewder 
assessment by former UNDP Cambodia Resident Representative, Paul Matthews stated: 
“There is a triangle: donors, recipients and the development industry. This is a 
powerful lobby and there is little public scrutiny in donor countries of this.”
53 
Bureaucratic Politics 
Another trend over the last decade has been the increase in bureaucratic sprawl 
which is amplified by power sharing between Funcinpec and the CPP.
54 The increase 
from two to three deputy directors per department has not produced efficiency gains 
and has left civil servants baffled and dejected, moonlighting at NGOs according to a 
livestock NGO official (28). Bureaucratic infighting within the departments has pushed 
out good talent and caused turf-wars between ministries. The lucrative business of 
controlling inspections has created oddities like the Ministry of Commerce (at one 
point) appointing itself in charge of sanitary inspections (by virtue of its Minister being 
in charge of WTO negotiations) while a draft sub-decree on MAFF’s website
55 calls on 
the DAHP as the responsible agency.
56 Both Ministries are controlled by Ministers who 
are members of the same ruling party and, it is believed, the same faction (Hun 
Sen’s).  
The prospect for effective pro-poor policy in livestock is thus marginal as the domestic 
political and institutional processes are aligned against their favorable 
implementation. The economic backdrop for pro-poor livestock policy, while rife with 
challenges, is relatively more promising because of Cambodia’s entry into WTO. 
Livestock has the potential to be a significant growth sub-sector because of robust 
regional demand even if agriculture has lagged for a decade due to constraints in 
markets, access, and land, all of which are discussed next. 
                                                 
52 A bilateral donor official (58) relayed a personal story about a specific loan project of at least $5 million in which the 
ministerial staff questioned whether $500’s worth of mosquito nets was “really necessary” because one had to “think of our 
children’s future in having to repay the loan”. Surprisingly there was no such outcry from these same staffers for the hugely 
bloated cost of rural infrastructure projects in other budget lines. Indeed the thrust was on keeping those costs sky-high. 
53 As quoted in Adams (2002). 
54 When the Khmer Rouge took power, the cabinet had less than a dozen members. This was intended to fight karyalayniyum 
or “bureaucratism”. 
55 A draft Sub-Decree dated 11 June 2002 on “Sanitary Inspection of Animal and Animal Products” aims to prevent the spread 
of animal diseases. The draft calls for all checkpoints of sanitary inspection for animal and animal products to be under the 
direct supervision of the Department of Animal Health and Production, adding “Any person who cheats the duty, penalty fee, 
regulated misconduct, receives pride [sic], offer pride [sic] or using the authority for own interest, a person shall be 
subjected to the criminal law.” 
56 A multilateral donor official (57) interviewed on 22 February 2005 says the issue, as he understands it, has been settled. 
Indeed, the same draft Prakas appears on the MoC website, which suggests that the MoC has ceded control to MAFF. 
However, on that same website, MoC (undated) states: “Camcontrol, a government agency under the authority of the 
Ministry of Commerce is responsible for SPS. With the assistance of FAO, Camcontrol has set up a testing facility for chemical 
analysis and is planning to set up one for microbiology testing. The Ministry of Agriculture keeps the list of pests and plant 
diseases subjected to plant quarantine in Cambodia and ensures phytosanitary controls at the border and issues phytosanitary 
certificates upon request of importers or exporters. Cambodia recognizes phytosanitary certificates of other countries. Under 
the WTO, Cambodia will need to set up Inquiry Points for SPS.”   
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3. ECONOMIC CONTEXT: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, LIVESTOCK 
AND AGRICULTURE 
Cambodia’s economic performance has enjoyed some notable successes in the last 
decade, especially in the area of macroeconomic stability, as it embraced aspects of 
the Washington Consensus (Ear, 1997). Inflation has been low for a number of years, 
and the exchange rate is stable. These are flipsides to the same coin thanks to as 
much as 90% dollarization. These successes are contrasted with a number of 
shortcomings in key areas of governance in Ear (2005). Cambodia became the first 
Least Developed Country to join the WTO in 2004. Despite the serious impact of 
corruption on Cambodia’s economy, the Heritage Foundation rates Cambodia as 
mostly free in terms of economic freedom with an overall score of 2.89 (ranked 63 
just above Mexico), placing it higher than Thailand (71), Vietnam (137), and Laos (150) 
out of 161 countries. Canada lauds Cambodia’s economy as having a “Liberal 
investment climate with many incentives” (GoC 2004). From an economic standpoint, 
Cambodia has made a full transition from command to market economy.
57 
Unfortunately, none of the negative side-effects were mitigated. 
3.1  Human Development 
Cambodia’s socio-economic and human development, while good in the early 1990s, 
has slowed or even slipped since the late 1990s. After more than US$5 billion in aid 
following the 1993 elections, more Cambodians may be poor in 2004 than were poor in 
1997. The country is also more unequal. Across human indicators such as illiteracy, 
infant and child mortality, Cambodia is worse off than it was in 1990. 
Poverty, Inequality, and Illiteracy 
Poverty is somewhat of a mystery in Cambodia as data is either missing or admittedly 
so flawed when collected that a caveat must be made when it is used.
59 What is known 
however is that poverty in Cambodia is inexorably linked with rural areas. Nearly 88% 
of the poor come from rural areas and 80% of the population is rural (see table). 
Table 3:  Rural and Urban Poverty in Cambodia* 
  1994  1997 
Rural 43.1  40.1 
Urban 24.8  21.1 
National 39  36.1 
Rural Pop (% of total population)  77.6  78.9 
% of total poverty that is rural  85.8  87.7 
 
* (% of population unless otherwise stated) 
Source: World Bank (2005b), author’s calculations for rural population and % of total poverty that is rural. 
                                                 
57 A 1994 circular issued by the Ministry of Commerce made the switch official, see RGC (1994). 
59 The case is of Round Two of the 1999 Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey, which had problems during the collection process. 
National poverty (urban and rural) is based on a standard caloric formula and stands at circa 55 cents per person per day. 3. Economic Context: Human Development, Livestock and Agriculture 
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As can be seen from the above poverty data, there was a modest impact on national 
poverty reduction from 1994 to 1997. After 1997 however, there may have been an 
increase due to the dramatic investor loss of confidence following the events of 5-6 
July that year. 
Since the government has not endorsed more recent poverty figures, the World Bank 
has had to extrapolate estimates, which show growing poverty and inequality. In a 
regional update last year, the World Bank’s estimates of $1–a-day poverty in 
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos (1990-2004) show that only Cambodia has observed a 
steady increase in poverty since 1996, from 36.7% to 45% in 2004. Likewise only 
Cambodia’s estimated Gini index has increased from 41.4 in 1998 to 48.1 in 2004.
60  
The Paradox of Increasing Infant Mortality and Consumption 
Further evidence of slippage can be observed with respect to the mortality rates of 
both infants and children under-5 years of age in Cambodia in the below table.  
Table 4:  Mortality Rate per 1,000 Live Births for Infants and Under-5 (1990-2001) 
  1990  1992  1995  1997  2000  2001 
Infant    80 83.2 88 90.8 95  97 
Under-5  115 .. 120 .. 135  138 
Source: World Bank (2005b). 
 
In 1990, eight infants out of 100 died at birth. By 2001, that number had increased to 
nearly 10. While 11.5% of children who were under five years of age died in 1990, by 
2001 that figure had increased to 13.8%, making Cambodia the country with the 
highest child mortality in the region. Stunting in children under five is prevalent, 
UNICEF (2004: 110) reports that 45% of under-fives suffer from moderate and severe 
from stunting (1995-2003).
61 Malnutrition remains a problem in 2005, as the World 
Food Programme (WFP) recently announced 1,500 metric tons of rice for distribution 
to 150,000 people due to drought conditions. According to an MAFF official (44), while 
rice figures prominently in Cambodian diets, taking 67% of calories, meat does not. 
In the pre-war period, meat consumption was not significant, as rice and fish were the 
main staples of a Cambodian diet according to a senior government official (54). With 
the Tonle Sap, Southeast Asia’s largest inland lake, protein came in large part from 
fish. It was believed that beef was an “energetic” food, sapping one’s strength, 
according to a livestock professional (52). While consumption has grown in the 
decades that have passed, FAO (2002) reports that Cambodia (along with Laos and 
Myanmar) had the lowest levels of protein from livestock products, at less than 10g 
per person per day in 1999. However, the report suggests that as incomes increase, so 
will consumption. The domestic market offers considerable potential and resourceful 
entrepreneurs have not lost sight of this (see box). 
                                                 
60 The Gini index is the Gini coefficient expressed in percentage form, and is equal to the Gini coefficient multiplied by 100. 
A Gini coefficient is an index between 1 (most inequitable outcome possible) and 0 (most equitable outcome possible). 
61 NGO Forum (2002: 11). 3. Economic Context: Human Development, Livestock and Agriculture 
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An Entrepreneur’s Perspective 
The Domestic Market 
“Some back of the envelope calculations. Meat: $1.8 billion spent on 
food, $1.4 billion on gasoline. For pork: 20% domestic, 80% 
international. 3000 pigs (this is slightly off from CEDAC interview, but 
not so off). 30 tons of pork, $12.5 million/month, $150 million per 
year… look at the importation of vegetables: 800 Riels/kilo vegetable or 
say 1000 Riels. [Government Advisor (45) estimates 90 tons.] We’re 
talking millions of dollars. You need only be watching at 9PM the trucks 
bringing in fish from Vietnam. Clearly there’s money to be made from 
local production. [The entrepreneur’s wants to be there to provide it, 
but his main problem is liquidity and credit, he needs millions more to 
exploit these opportunities, but he can’t borrow it]. At kilometer 9, 
12AM, where are the trucks coming from? Vietnam. Each man, woman 
and child eats 30 kilos of fish, multiply that by 13 million. 50% of this is 
imported. Bean and corn can be produced, and these can then be used 
as feed.” 
The Role of Government 
Regarding government’s role, he believes that only the government can 
make the needed changes. International agencies can advise, but they 
are not the government, nor are NGOs. His take on the government is 
fascinating. He calls ministers “takay” which literally means “boss” and 
the PM is a “bong thom” or “big brother” which is slang for gangster or 
gang member. He does not consider what is known as the government in 
Cambodia to be a government. In fact, he thinks it’s a private 
corporation out there to extract resources and is absolutely not ready 
to make the necessary reforms so long as it hurts their personal bottom 
lines. He considers international actors such as Mekong Project 
Development Facility and the International Finance Corporation to be 
important players, they are there to give ideas. Politicians need money 
for their politics and if they don’t need it they won’t make any 
changes. 
Source: Interview with a private sector entrepreneur (29). 
 
3.2  Agriculture 
Macroeconomic Performance 
A decade ago, if anyone asked what Cambodia’s main growth sectors would be, the 
answer likely would have been Agriculture and Tourism (Sciaroni, 2004). While 
Tourism became Cambodia’s second most important source of foreign exchange, with 
the famed Angkor Wat temples being an international draw and more than one million 
tourists arriving in 2004, agriculture failed to deliver on its promise. Instead, garments 
became Cambodia’s most important foreign exchange earner because of the Multi-3. Economic Context: Human Development, Livestock and Agriculture 
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Fiber Agreement which allowed Cambodia to export garments to the US and Europe.
62 
Today, Cambodia has one of the narrowest growth bases in the world (World Bank, 
2005a) because of its astonishing reliance on garments manufacturing, an industry 
that employs less than 3% of the labor force. What ended-up happening in agriculture 
in the last decade? 
Agriculture shrank 9.7% as a relative share of GDP (1993-1997 compared to 1997-2001) 
and its sub-sectors saw anemic growth (see Table). Much of this can be attributed to 
the Forestry sub-sector (-25.8%) which collapsed as a direct result of donor pressure 
for reform, and led to a complete moratorium on log transportation in 2002.
63 Between 
1993-97 and 1997-2001, livestock’s share of agriculture grew 5.9%.
64 The Table 
beneath it shows sub-sector growth between 1994 and 2002. 
Table 5:  Shared contribution in GDP by Sectors and Sub-sectors (in %) 
 





 Agriculture  49.0  44.2  46.4  -9.7 
 Industry  13.5  19.2  16.4  42.2 
 Service  37.5  36.6  37.2  -2.4 
Crop 44.3  46.5  45.3  5.0 
Livestock 13.6  14.4  14.1  5.9 
Fisheries 29.8  29.8  30.1  No  change 
Shares of Sub-sectors in 
Agriculture GDP 
Forestry 12.4  9.2  10.4  -25.8 
Source: Sen (2003a). 
 
If nurtured effectively, the livestock sub-sector has the potential to reduce poverty in 
Cambodia. Its importance in the lives of poor smallholders is recognized by the 
numerous NGOs that work on livestock and the relatively few donors (French 
Cooperation, IFAD, World Bank, GTZ, and EC) who have projects or project 
components that include livestock. And while livestock represents almost seven 
percent of the economy (GDP is about $4 billion)
65 or circa $250 million, the 
government allocated only about $200,000 or less than 0.03% of total government 
expenditures ($734.8 million estimated in 2003) to activities in the sector (non-
inclusive of wage bill of department staff) according to a livestock official (47). 
Youth and Rural Unemployment: Unleashing Agriculture’s Potential 
While agriculture has not been a growth sector in recent years, there exists an 
opportunity for development of the sector in the next few years to absorb the rural 
unemployed joining the labor force each year. With a labor force that grows by 
                                                 
62 Indeed, in 1996, the phenomenon had only started and one could read stories in the local English-language newspapers of 
re-exported garments (made in neighboring Vietnam, for example, but exported with a “Made in Cambodia” label). 
63 The three-year moratorium on log transportation in Cambodia was lifted in December 2004. 
64 Due to Cambodia’s growing reliance during that same period on the garments industry, economy-wide, livestock shrank by 
4.5% between these same periods as an overall share of GDP. 
65 This is generally regarded as underestimated because of the extent of the informal economy in Cambodia. 3. Economic Context: Human Development, Livestock and Agriculture 
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150,000-250,000 workers each year, potential for “social unrest” was intimated by a 
major donor
66 and the outgoing US Ambassador. More than half of these are women. 
No credible statistics exist to estimate unemployment in Cambodia. Demographically, 
more than half the population is less than 20-years old, 42% is under 15.
68  
Only 30,000 to 40,000 jobs have been created annually over the last ten years, mostly 
in the garment industry which employed 300,000 workers in December 2004.
69 With 
the end of the quota system in the garment industry effective on 31 December 2004, 
retrenchment in the sector is expected as China swallows most of the world textile 
market because of its low production costs and economies of scale, despite 
announcing the implementation of an export tax on its textiles. According to 
government and industry sources, 70 out of 290 garment factories registered since 
1996 have been forced to close down (Prak, 2005), and 47,670 workers have lost their 
jobs since the end of the quota system. 
Even if up to 30,000 jobs were created annually from the anticipated growth of 
tourism and some other industries such as trade and construction, this is only a small 
fraction of the 150,000-250,000 entrants. Therefore, joblessness (and the problems it 
entails) is expected to increase dramatically in the years to come. The government’s 
first action upon formation of the new government for the Third Mandate was to 
approve a sub-decree requiring mandatory military service for 18-30 year old males 
(Mekong Law Group et al., 2004).
70 This is widely seen as a pretext to contain 
members of that age group, believed to support the opposition party, even though no 
resources exist to fund this policy. The real hope, in fact, as Godfrey (2003) has 
pointed out, with the end of garments and the unpredictability of tourism (due to 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, which caused a 10% drop in Tourism in 2003), is 
agriculture.  
3.3  Livestock 
The Herd 
The 2002 animal census published by the DAHP shows a total bovine population of 
approximately 3.55 million animals (including 625,930 buffalos), pigs numbering 2.1 
million, and poultry of approximately 16.65 million animals of which approximately 
half are ducks. As with much of the data in Cambodia, Desvaux (2004: 7) warns that 
these figures are only indicative. She also notes that few records are kept and the 
significant illegal traffic of animals between Cambodia and neighboring countries, in 
particular Thailand and Vietnam, makes it very difficult to pin down. 
Except for buffalos, all other populations of livestock are thought to have risen 
annually. Milk production from dairy cattle is negligible, and what little was produced 
by Nestlé’s $2 million dairy project in the outskirts of Phnom Penh was shut down 
three years ago due to excessive smuggling of counterfeit cans and competitors’ 
products according to a multilateral donor official (57) and Hayes (2002), 
                                                 
66 When interviewed, the donor said that press reports blew his “civil unrest” comment out of proportion.  
68 This unusually young population can be partly explained by the tragedy of the Democratic Kampuchea period. The need for 
replacement was strong. 
69 The figure is from Reuters (2004) and Jang (2004). 
70 During the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979-1989) period three years of military service was required (most of which 
was on the frontlines against the Khmer Rouge and the noncommunist resistance that included Funcinpec) up until 1985. 
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respectively.
71 The following box takes an agribusiness perspective to livestock, 
suggesting that exports may have major potential. If this involved large numbers of 
poor people, the impact of exporting cattle, for example, would present itself in 
higher prices and thus be incentive compatible. The regional market for cattle is 
explored as a strategic entry in section 4.3, which focuses on the export potential for 
cattle. 
 
Export of Livestock 
Various studies, and experience, suggest that there may be 
considerable opportunities for Cambodia to export livestock, notably, 
cattle, buffalo, pigs, and poultry. Currently, the cattle trade is 
primarily through smuggling. Properly fattened, Cambodian cattle could 
be sold into regional markets, and perhaps meet increasing demand in 
the Middle East. Limited exports have been sold to Malaysia. Recently, 
animal diseases have made global trade in livestock precarious; meeting 
health standards is vital. This can be achieved by developing veterinary 
services and access to veterinary medicines.  
Trade conditions for livestock are otherwise relatively open. To develop 
as a significant exporter the Cambodian cattle sector needs (1) 
organization; (2) to meet local demand for animal feed, at competitive 
prices, to fatten livestock (the constituents of which all exist in 
Cambodia); (3) continued improvement of veterinary services and the 
enhanced availability of veterinary medicines and vaccines without 
which endemic diseases like foot-and-mouth will not be controlled; and 
(4) the reduction of informal domestic payments required to transport 
cattle and move them through the ports. 
Source: Adapted from MoC and MPDF (2005). 
 
According to a senior government official (53), total commercial poultry regulated 
stood at 736,172 birds (in 2005) or only 4.4% of the total poultry population (using the 
2002 population which has no doubt grown since then). This is indicative of how 
underdeveloped commercial operations are in Cambodia. The vast majority of poultry 
production does not involve any regulation by DAHP and suggests the huge untapped 
potential in the sector. More than 95% is thus smallholder-owned, a figure confirmed 
by DAHP (2001). Thus, the potential for development of smallholder livestock is 
tremendous as commercial operations are still insignificant compared to smallholders.  
This also suggests that livestock touches the lives of the poor in so many ways formal 
institutions like banks and micro-credit institutions cannot (or have not). Livestock is 
widely recognized as a form of savings. Chickens are sold for small expenses like 
schooling, while pigs represent bigger ticket items, and cattle and buffalos are sold 
for major expenses like a funeral or a wedding. Animals constitute an important 
source of family income. As such, their loss can be disastrous. 
                                                 
71 According to Desvaux (2004: 9), from 1968 to 1972, there was a dairy facility in Stung Meanchey that produced between 
500 and 700 litters per day. Some of the milk was sold fresh, while the remainder was used to produce yogurt and cheese. It 
was supported by the French government with dairy cattle raised by farmers (about 500) in the Kien Svay district, Kandal 
province near Phnom Penh. This is also where Nestlé began operations in 1998 to introduce dairy breeds by artificial 
insemination with local breeds. According to Hayes (2002), “It initially began operations in Cambodia in 1970 but shut down 
its plant due to the civil war prior to 1975.” Today, milk is not produced in any consequential quantities and what is 
available in Cambodia is imported. Consumption is among the lowest in the world, at an estimated 3kg/year. Thailand is a 
net importer of at least some milk, but it is the main exporter of milk to Cambodia according to an NGO professional (55). 3. Economic Context: Human Development, Livestock and Agriculture 
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Animal Mortality 
The Rectangular Strategy that became the government’s background document for the 
2004 Consultative Group (CG) Meeting includes a request for donors to help fund a 
project to decrease the morbidity and mortality of livestock, both of which are 
severe. An estimate of 10,000 cows with FMD and 5,000 with pasteurellosis was 
offered by MAFF Secretary of State Yim Vanthoeun, who is himself a veterinarian 
(Wasson and Lor, 2005). Other livestock professionals have estimated overall poultry 
mortality rates of 30% (livestock professional, 35) and 50-100% for Newcastle 
(livestock official, 47). For pigs the range was 30-40% (livestock official, 47) and for 
piglets mortality is 40% (livestock professional, 21, also see Annex A of DAHP, 2000). 
With such high mortality figures, the returns to preventive veterinary care are 
significant. Normally it is hard to get farmers to pay for preventive medicine for their 
animals (as opposed to curative interventions for those already sick). But death rates 
such as these probably mean that farmers would indeed pay all or much of the price 
of effective preventive measures, if they were made available to them--and if they 
could recover the cash paid out through sales on an adequately functioning market.
72 
Animal mortality and disease are systemically linked to other crises that impact upon 
rural Cambodians (Murshid, 1998: 54). The loss of livestock due to illness or theft or 
abnormally high market transaction costs means that many rural households have no 
way to meet the expenditure necessary for crises associated with natural disasters, 
and the illness or death of household members. Feed improvements introduced also 
have ameliorated animal health conditions. Necessary conditions for Cambodia to 
become a significant exporter of livestock have yet to be met, as the country depends 
on imported livestock even though it has the raw materials needed for feed but 
cannot process them (see earlier box). A reason for the failure of livestock to take-off 
has been that agriculture itself has not been a growth sector in recent years. 
Role and Gender Divisions 
Livestock has a long and venerated history in Cambodian agriculture. Each year the 
coming harvest is foretold at the Royal plowing ceremony in which six royal oxen are 
offered various items to consume, including grain and alcohol placed on gilded trays. 
If they choose alcohol, it portends inadequate rain and a disastrous harvest. The Royal 
Oxen’s aversion to alcohol in recent years unfortunately did little to prevent 
catastrophic floods (2000 and 2001) and drought (2004, which has extended into 
2005).  
According to UNICEF, during the 1980s, most families kept livestock, their numbers 
mainly determined by the availability of animal feed and land for foraging. Pigs, 
chickens and ducks as well as eggs were normally sold for cash to purchase goods 
rather than being eaten regularly. Larger livestock like cows and buffaloes were rarely 
consumed for meat, but used as draught animals in the fields.
73 Therefore as is true 
today, a family's stock of animals represented its savings and reserve resources and 
not its main source of supplementary food (UNICEF, 1990 as cited in FAO, undated).  
                                                 
72 The crucial importance of animal drugs is worth mentioning. While import licenses have been abolished for most items, 
some remain in effect for pharmaceuticals. Agrovet, a French-Cambodian company and representative for MERIAL which 
targets medium to large producers, and Medivet a Cambodian company operated by a former school teacher, are both 
companies that sell pharmaceuticals in Cambodia. A livestock professional (35) tried to legitimately import pharmaceuticals, 
by bringing in cases through the airport (as luggage) and ended-up paying 2.5 times more in taxes. He then attempted to 
import legally from Thailand via Sihanoukville port. He was again taxed heavily. He is now importing from Vietnam but with 
official drug representatives who ensure a deliverable price (so he never sees the actual details of bribes etc). What matters 
is that he can still make money despite their fees. When prompted with “But aren’t you evading the system?” his response 
was yes, but he would be more than happy to pay if everyone else was made to pay too (an issue of unfair competition). 
Animal mortality and morbidity both remain significant problems in Cambodia. 
73 Today, when consumed, such animals tend to be slaughtered at a terminal stage (having worked their productive lives in 
the field). 3. Economic Context: Human Development, Livestock and Agriculture 
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The gender division of labor in livestock management is quite rigid. Men care for and 
utilize draught animals, like oxen, cows and buffaloes. Women care for, manage and 
sell small livestock like pigs, chickens and ducks. Nowadays, women who head their 
household and lack sufficient male labor utilize draught animals to plough (SAWA, 
1995 as cited in FAO, undated). Such animals are costly, and so women will try to 
raise pigs and poultry. This suggests that pro-poor targeting could encompass women 
heads of households or families which own only limited pigs and poultry. Interventions 
that aim to increase pigs and poultry production may make sense.
74 While 
microfinance has not been exclusively the domain of women, its origins focusing on 
women’s groups lend important insights into the credit market for livestock and could 
be a key to at least one strategic entry proposed—subsidized lending for women 
breeders affected by culling due to HPAI (see Section 4.3). 
Lending for Livestock 
There are few commercial banks in rural areas, and in many areas the only options for 
credit are either family or the local moneylender.
75 The Economist Intelligence Unit 
notes that “a well-developed informal credit market…provides an important, if 
expensive, source of funding for small businesses and farmers.”
76 The local 
moneylender rates are extremely high, frequently 20% per month (EC, 2002). During 
the last eight to ten years a number of NGOs and donor projects have provided credit 
in the rural areas, including the European Commission’s PRASAC program which ended 
recently according to a multilateral donor official (12). There are more than 70 
licensed or registered MFIs in Cambodia, many of which are dependent on donations or 
subsidies (In, 2004). Despite this, less than 50% of demand is met (Ibid). Because of 
the prevalence of dollarization in Cambodia (as much as 90% of the economy is not in 
Riels), and the Riel’s virtual peg to the dollar (stable at around 4000 Riels to the 
dollar for several years, 3,795 in 1998, 3,831 in 1999, 3,868 in 2000, 3,918 in 2001, 
and 3,923 in 2002), the real interest follows the nominal interest rate closely (because 
inflation is low, averaging 4.37% between 1995-2002). 
Moreover, to use the language of Scott (1976), the moral economy of the peasant has 
been replaced by the exchange economy in Cambodia. According to AusAID, the 
emergency phase of Cambodia which most would agree ended in 1998 still haunts the 
country. Relief-type assistance has, in some instances, established a handout 
mentality. “One district leader warned the team against supporting any form of credit 
that was not solidly entrenched within a bank. If locals thought there was government 
involvement, this official noted, they would refuse to repay any loans” (AusAID, 2005: 
4). This has been true as well for WFP’s Food-for-Work Scheme. According to 
Aschmoneit (1998: 5), Achar (Abott) Chun Chin of Wat Botum explained with some 
bitterness that in former times it had not been difficult to mobilize villagers to repair 
roads and ponds after the rainy season. But since WFP had been remunerating all 
community work with rice on a food-for-work basis, people had been asking the Achar: 
“How much rice will you pay for that?” They were no longer willing to perform unpaid 
labor as before. Many Achars have had similar experiences in their own villages. 
In rural areas, delivery costs can be even higher, and this is reflected in the typical 
interest rates of 3-4% per month (EC, 2002). One senior government official (48) asked 
why MFI rates were so high and viewed them a usurious. While MFI interest rates are 
indeed high, they are the prevailing market interest rates and are highly competitive 
                                                 
74 A senior government official (53) reports that CEDAC funded the purchase of poultry for a community with loans of up to 
20,000 Riels ($5) per family. An outbreak of Newcastle disease however destroyed all 900 chickens in that community. 
75 Another possible credit delivery mechanism for rapid rural development is the provision of loans to farmers by private 
companies against a contract to purchase production and fixed prices (EC, 2002). 
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in comparison to informal money lenders.
77 Indeed, a prevalent practice in Cambodia 
is to work at a Bank and obtain loans from it. Cambodia’s high capitalization ratio and 
requirement that each Bank keep $13 million with the National Bank of Cambodia 
have subdued lending. With respect to MFIs, it is reasonable to subsidize their 
administrative costs, as these are very high. This has been done by Grameen in 
Bangladesh. The important thing is that the loan should carry an interest rate that is 
at least as high as what a bank in the capital would charge to a businessman. The 
literature on this is very well developed and the practice well established (see 
Peterson, 1982). 
The Case of Acleda Bank 
Started as a project of the International Labor Organisation and later registered as an 
NGO, Acleda Bank was until recently Cambodia’s largest MFI until it converted to a 
full-fledged bank in 2004, with continued emphasis on microfinance. Acleda has 
argued that lending at artificial or subsidized rates only prevents the determination of 
'fair price' which in turn leads to unreal expectations, discourages further investment, 
distorts performance measurement and undermines those it is intended to help by 
creating ongoing donor dependency. Indeed, Acleda’s distribution network required to 
reach nearly 110,000 borrowers spans 114 offices spread around rural areas in 21 
provinces (In, 2004). 
On 20 December 2004, Acleda became Cambodia’s first institution to obtain a credit 
rating of any kind. Moody’s gave Acleda’s Bank Financial Strength Rating a D with a 
stable outlook and Deposit and Debt Rating (in local currency loans) of Ba1/B3. It has 
superior ratings to a weighted average of institutions in Indonesia, India, the 
Philippines and Morocco (Moody’s, 2004). Animal-related loans accounted for 0.42% of 
their $50 million portfolio in July 2004. While this constraint can be met effectively 
with a government policy favoring livestock-related lending, it is politically unrealistic 
to expect that the government, which has refused compensation for Highly Pathogenic 
Avian Influenza-impacted producers, to step in with resources. It is however possible 
that donors interested in helping the government meet its needs in combating HPAI 
could establish a lending activity in conjunction with Acleda or another MFI (of which 
there many) to subsidize loans to HPAI-impacted producers (more on this when 
strategic entries are discussed). 
                                                 
77 I thank David Leonard for pointing out that it is not unusual for the well-connected to make such comments because they 
are the ones who can use their influence to get below market rate loans – so they want such loans to exist.  
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4. POLICY CONTEXT: SECTOR CHALLENGES, PRO-POOR LIVESTOCK 
POLICIES AND STRATEGIC ENTRIES 
4.1  Sector Challenges 
According to EC (2002), the constraints to designing effective rural development 
programs can be summed up as shortages of key inputs, inaccessibility, insecurity, 
limited technical capacity at ministry level, limited skill base at village level, and 
disinclination towards community or group actions due to low social capital following 
the Khmer Rouge period. While these challenges have been discussed in some way or 
another already, specific challenges have been identified by Woodd (2004) and during 
interviews (see table). The eight challenges suggest that the problems of livestock are 
much wider than just the sub-sector alone, they are agriculture-wide and economy-
wide. These have been set under three thematic categories: (A) Markets; (B) Access; 
and (C) Land. 
Table 6:  Challenges in Agriculture: Markets, Access, and Land 
A. Markets  Analysis 
1. Widespread corruption in 
supply chains 
Pros: Donors have recently demanded change to business as usual.  
Cons: Deeply embedded now, part of the culture itself  
Low probability of success in combating the problem 
2. Lack of confidence in 
investment 
Pros: WTO membership will mean some guaranteed progress (a kind 
of straightjacket) 
Cons: “Laws are not important” (Livestock professional, 52) 
Moderate probability of success since legal framework must be 
developed for WTO 
3. Lack of an established 
trading infrastructure 
Pros: Rational farmers can be expected to be responsive to better 
prices, and they are 
Cons: Pervasive corruption means they won’t produce as much for 
the market 
Low to moderate probability of success since tied-in with 1 & 2.  
B. Access   
4. Lack of irrigation/roads  Pros: Government recognizes these problems 
Cons: It doesn’t have the political will to commit resources 
Low probability of success without increased donor support 4. Policy Context: Sector Challenges, Pro-poor Livestock Policies and Strategic Entries 
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5. Cost of energy  Pros: Private sector has complained loudly, as have urban population 
(a few protests) 
Cons: Government relies heavily on fuel excise tax for revenues since 
it is unwilling or unable to expand tax base for obvious political 
economy reasons 
Low probability of success, especially since donors want the 
government to increase tax revenues, but care less about how it does 
so 
6. Cross-border barriers  Pros: Cambodia is well positioned regionally to take advantage of the 
cattle trade 
Cons: Foot-and-Mouth Disease and SPS Agreement might lock 
Cambodia out 
Moderate probability of success for same reason as 2, plus private 
sector interest 
C. Land   
7. Misuse of large-scale land 
concessions 
Pros: Donors have demanded change, and increasing protests concern 
authorities 
Cons: Powerful interests involved, including senior members of 
government 
Low probability of success 
8. Insecurity of land tenure  Pros: Donors have worked to introduce land registration 
Cons: Authorities see this as yet another opportunity for informal 
revenues 
Low probability of success 
Source: Challenges adapted from Woodd (2004), analysis is author’s. 
 
Some of these challenges have been touched upon earlier already (A1/Markets and 
Corruption for example), revealing the government’s lack of political commitment due 
to a variety of factors including an embedded culture of corruption, the legacy of the 
Khmer Rouge, and the Donor-Government Nexus. The prospects for significant 
progress in overcoming these challenges is unlikely.  
The Feasible Set: Investment Confidence, Trading Infrastructure, and 
Cross-Border Issues 
The factors and forces which might permit s o m e  c h a l l e n g e s  t o  b e  o v e r c o m e  i n  
Cambodia requires that powerful vested interests, far from being opposed to them, 
could actually benefit in some way by their implementation. Such is the case of 4. Policy Context: Sector Challenges, Pro-poor Livestock Policies and Strategic Entries 
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membership in WTO and the introduction of Export-Processing Zones (EPZs).
78 Many of 
these challenges to agriculture will not be solved in the short-to-medium term, and 
may not be solved in the long-term. But let us begin. Areas in which moderate 
political feasibility exists include A2 (lack of confidence in investment), A3 (lack of an 
established trading infrastructure), and B6 (cross-border barriers). They hinge on 
Cambodia’s membership in the WTO and rational price responsiveness by farmers. 
While the rule of law has not had a distinguished record in Cambodia, and corruption 
is embedded, it has been argued that Cambodia’s membership in the WTO is the 
straightjacket the country needs to reform (which speaks volumes of its commitment 
to reform in the absence of WTO). 
With respect to both A2 and A3 specifically, livestock markets are limited or 
nonexistent because production was for too many years subsistence-based (the meat 
market is seen as a terminal, at the end of the life of the animal), but if you build it, 
will they come? The EC plans to build a demonstration abattoir in the north of the 
country. A senior government official (40) says that checkpoints on rural roads are not 
prevalent (of course he is defending the roads his Ministry is building), which is 
probably true, but the Prime Minister felt obliged to announce an end to illegal 
checkpoints recently, the N-th time he has done so in as many years. 
Finally, with respect to B6, the low Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards in Cambodia 
make the country ineligible to export legally anywhere with higher standards (which 
means virtually nowhere). This ties-in with the OIE (World Organization for Animal 
Health) as the agency designated by the WTO to oversee livestock exports. Cambodia, 
being a small country, cannot affect world prices.
79 SPS Agreement enforcement is 
required as of 2008, per Cambodia’s WTO terms of accession. It will mean that 
Cambodia has until then to establish a production base or else be decimated by 
imports which are cheaper, of higher standard, and cannot be blocked, unless it 
proves that its domestic products are of a higher standard. Furthermore, no producer 
subsidies in agriculture are permitted on the Cambodian side. The political feasibility 
of an intervention in this area has mostly to do with the confluence of private and 
public sector interest, which could be a driver for an FMD-free zone, discussed in 
greater detail later. 
Remaining Issues of Accessibility: Lack of Irrigation/Roads and Cost of 
Energy 
With respect to B4, only 19.5% of cultivated land is irrigated (as opposed to rain-fed). 
The government’s goal is to bring this to 24% by 2007 (RGC, 2002b). Even though the 
country enjoys the region’s largest inland freshwater lake, the Tonle Sap (Great 
Lake), the odds are not great that this target will be achieved given that some 30,000 
ha/per year of irrigated land would need to be added (NGO Forum, 2003) and the 
current drought situation is the government’s current pre-occupation. Non-foraging 
livestock needs water and feed at a minimum (the import of which is costly). The husk 
and hay that result from rice milling and harvesting is used as feed and cannot be 
produced without water. Without roads, farmers are unable to bring their products to 
markets. The supply chain is thus disrupted with the absence of either water or roads 
as Godfrey (2003) has argued and implored Cambodia to consider as complementary 
prerequisites to growth.
80 
                                                 
78 During 2005, the Cambodian government is expected to debate a draft Law on Industrial Zones that will lead to the 
formation of EPZs in Cambodia. These will likely be located in the port city of Sihanoukville and on the Thai-Cambodian 
border province of Koh Kong. 
79 Under standard trade theory, a small country’s best trade policy is to remain open. 
80 The Prime Minister recognized this twin relationship between water and roads as well in his speeches. Cambodia New 
Vision Issue 38, March 2001 excerpts his closing address at the March 12-14, 2001 Addresses to the 2nd National Conference 
on the Implementation of the Government’s Political Platform for Social Development and Poverty Reduction. 4. Policy Context: Sector Challenges, Pro-poor Livestock Policies and Strategic Entries 
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With respect to B5, Cambodia’s energy prices are very high compared to international 
averages. Fuel prices due, to Cambodia’s heavy reliance on excise taxes as a source of 
revenue for the domestic treasury, represent 1/3 of fuel prices and reduce 
Cambodia’s competitiveness. Both Thailand and Vietnam gasoline prices are 1/3 less 
than in Cambodia (Vietnam subsidizes its fuel). This is a major factor in smuggling of 
fuel itself. Fuel costs go into the transport costs of livestock. The situation with 
electricity is similar. World Bank (2004: 26) states that “Where electricity is available, 
firms and individual consumers face some of the highest energy costs in the world.” 
Land Problems 
Addressing the issue of large-scale land concessions (C7) and the insecurity of land 
tenure (C8) was a major donor demand at the December 2004 CG, but this issue has 
festered since at least 1999 when it was recognized that land disputes caused the 
biggest backlog of court cases. At that time, Hun Sen told provincial governors that 
they would lose their jobs if this problem was not resolved. By 2004, the World Bank 
country manager Nisha Agrawal said that up to 80% of Cambodian court cases involving 
the poor involve land disputes. She added “If we care about the poor, if we care about 
rural economic growth, and if we care about justice, we must care greatly about 
land.”
81  
The strength of interest groups behind the large scale land concessions is so 
enormous, however, that to address them would have to begin with senior members of 
the RCAF and oligarch business interests, both of whom are untouchable. Indeed, a 
major cause of conflicts has been land, especially land grabbing by the rich and 
powerful. Landlessness is now prevalent in 12-15% of the rural population and 
landholdings per household appear to be declining (Murray, 2005). Without land, 
farmers have “little incentive to make long-term plans to improve their family's 
livelihood such as investing in infrastructure” (Ibid.). While there have been protests 
in front of the National Assembly, these have been put down with minimal force until 
recently. In March 2005, military police and police shot dead five people in order to 
clear 218 families from an area in Kbal Spean village, Banteay Meanchey province. 
Human rights activists monitoring the carnage were threatened with arrest.
82 
Pro-Poor Policy, Spending, and Reality 
Existing pro-poor policies take a technocratic approach that invariably fails. If these 
policies do not invite patronage politics, they will be left unimplemented. The 
political constraints have been enumerated in Section 2. Needless to say, the 
transaction costs of corruption create negative incentives for producers, but while 
hopes have risen each year that some action will take place, these have invariably 
been dashed. Cambodia still has no anti-corruption law, although the idea was first 
discussed in 1994. The current draft is so watered-down it fails to meet United Nations 
Convention against Corruption standards. Speaking of the 1998 elections, two UNTAC 
officials who returned to the country to observe highlighted not only a lack of 
commitment to good governance, liberal democracy and rule of law "but [the CPP's] 
desire to work against those objectives."
83 
                                                 
81 As quoted in Leitsinger (2005). 
82 See AFP (2005a). 
83 They further added: "It is entirely appropriate to make allowances for the unavoidable difficulties faced by developing 
countries, such a poor infrastructure, a limited skill base, or random events such as bad weather … The deficiencies of the 
1998 election which we have identified, however, were not of that character. They were rather a direct result of conscious 
political decisions, taken by members of the ruling clique for their own benefit, in full knowledge of what they were doing … 
The actions in question defied the spirit of the country's Constitution, and it would be wrong to treat them... as if they are 
somehow an inevitable feature of life in the third world" (as quoted in Grainger, 1998). In contrast, Margaret Slocombe 
argues that: "The main problem with politics in Cambodia is having a Lexus Constitution when what is really needed is a 
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Understanding the sectoral challenges outlined above in the context of political 
reality can aid in framing the scope for pro-poor policy, and pro-poor livestock policy 
in particular. FAO (2000) defined the most important strength of pro-poor policy as 
“the allocation of public expenditure to those populations and areas in which the poor 
predominate” and concluded that “In practice, this almost invariably means devoting 
greater amounts of public resources to rural areas and leaving more activities to the 
private sector in the higher-potential areas and sectors.” The constellation of 
interests preventing the redistribution of wealth is strong. For the sake of 
profitability, the private sector knows well enough to accommodate power. 
Phnom Penh has had limited success in sharing the wealth. In 2003, the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance confirmed that it had distributed to the provinces only 39% of 
total MAFF spending, while the central level consumed the remaining 61%. It conceded 
“This is a serious problem” (MEF, 2004). This inequitable distribution of resources 
between the central and provincial levels hampers the implementation of pro-poor 
policies. Given the extent of rural poverty, reversing this resource flow has been 
strongly advocated by donors.  
Current political and institutional processes are profoundly anti-poor. Feasible pro-
poor policy has been elusive in the context of Cambodian development. As a bilateral 
donor official (26) argued, the focus should be on shifting the government from a pro-
rich to a neutral policy environment before we can even discuss pro-poor policy. 
Poverty reduction is an abstraction; repeating it over and over will not make it a 
reality. To adapt Sadako Ogata’s (2005) notion that there are “no humanitarian 
solutions to humanitarian problems”—only the convergence of political interest can 
solve them (Conant, 2005), one could argue that likewise, there are no pro-poor 
solutions to poverty problems in Cambodia—only political will and the constellation of 
interests converging can solve them. And while William Easterly rightly argues that 
“development is too important to leave to the politicians” wishing it were so will not 
make the problem (i.e., the politicians) go away. Prospects for the short-to-medium 
term are dim and expectations should be limited. 
4.2  Current Pro-Poor Livestock Policies 
Current livestock policies are guided somewhat by the three strategy/policy 
documents earlier described: SEDPII, NPRS, and Rectangular Strategy. The SEDPII 
contains cursory treatment of livestock. The NPRS was released in 2002 and, unlike 
the PRSPs of many countries (see Blench et al., 2003), it has more than passing 
mention of livestock (20 instances). It also includes a section under its financing 
matrix for livestock activities. Like the Consultative Group Donor Appeals (the 
government’s wish list) in 2002 and 2004 however, these are unlikely to be funded.  
The most recent strategy, the government’s own Rectangular Strategy was released in 
2004 following the formation of the government for the Third Mandate. It contains the 
least coverage of livestock specifically but its overall ideas are similar to SEDPII and 
NPRS and it has one rectangle dedicated to agriculture. The RS does not contain any 
performance indicators or benchmarks, only vague commitments to increase 
expenditures. Beyond this, the MAFF has on its website a prioritization of its sub-
sectors and lists livestock as the No. 1 priority in four provinces: Svay Rieng, Preah 
Vihear, Kampot, and Kampong Thom, while it is No. 2 priority in 10 provinces, and No. 
3 in six provinces. The remaining three provinces have it as 4
th or 5
th or not applicable. 
Of the 23 provinces and districts, two have multiple first priorities (Svay Rieng has 
two, Kampong Thom has four).
84 
                                                 
84 A constant complaint of donors has been the Government’s inability to prioritize, leading a French Cooperation 
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The main document for livestock policy, “Linear Animal Health Strategy and Policy 
Development,” was published in 2001 and forms a set of pro-poor livestock policies 
issued in a Strategy and Policy document for the sub-sector that was adopted by the 
DAHP under the Agricultural Productivity Improvement Project (APIP) funded by the 
World Bank and IFAD.
85 Both a Basic Strategy and a Smallholder Strategy were 
proposed, with a number of cross-cutting policies. Every item under these policies is 
shown verbatim in the Table below and has been further aggregated under five 
thematic categories: (D) Income, Investment, and Production; (E) Risk Alleviation, 
Trade, and Commerce; (F) Promoting Market Access; (G) Production at the Village 
Level; and (H) Role of Animal Production Services (APS). 
Table 7:  Basic Strategy and Strategy for the Smallholder Sector 
I. Basic Strategy 
D. Income, Investment, and Production 
1. Use livestock to improve rural incomes and as a means of exiting from poverty.  
2. The general strategy however remains to encourage private investment in livestock production 
in line with government policy and provide the right investment environment for both commercial 
and small producer levels.  
3. Animal Production Services (APS) will be expected to develop strategies and policies that target 
small and disadvantaged producers who hold the majority of livestock (95%+) to allow them to 
compete with commercial production and partake equitably in the increasing demand for livestock 
products. 
E. Risk Alleviation, Trade, and Commerce 
1. Promote risk alleviation by providing ready access to animal health services, disease control 
programs that contains endemic disease and access to essential inputs.  
2. Support programs that establish quality assurance programs that have the potential to expand 
domestic and regional markets for livestock and livestock products.  
3. Promote sustainable livestock production at the small holder level in order to promote low input 
and high output production systems to compete with the commercial production 
 
II. Smallholder Strategy 
F. Promoting Market Access 
1. Promote a free market strategy that widens marketing options and equitable farm gate prices.  
2. The strategy will be to establish sustainable livestock production technology at the village level 
that focuses on limiting cash inputs in the production cycle while maximising production and 
profitability to enable small producers to compete in a free market environment.  
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G. Production at the Village Level 
1. Reduce production risk by the involvement of the Village Animal Health System (VAHS) in animal 
health programs for small producers and for Village Animal Health Workers (VAHWs) to provide the 
ready availability of essential inputs (pharmaceutical and nutritional) at the village level.  
2. Use the information and technical support of the National Animal Health and Production 
Investigation Centre (NAHPIC) and the National Animal Health and Production Diagnostic and 
Information Storage System (NAHPIS) to identify and target specific production constraints at the 
village level. 
H. Role of Animal Production Services 
1. Targeting the smallholder producers will be the main task of the APS. The strategy will be that 
of assistance and access to inputs on the premise of full cost recovery.  
2. APS and AP staff of the OAHP [DAHP] will receive training in Sustainable Livestock Production 
(SLP) at the University of Tropical Agriculture (UTA) and its assistance in the transference of the 
technology as SLP demonstrations and feed development programs to the 4 target provinces of 
APIP.  
3. Each APS staff member will compliment the SLP training by a specialist orientation to a specific 
technical aspect that will provide specialist assistance for small producers to be competitive in a 
free market environment.  
4. The initial specialisation focus of APS will be in the area s of animal breeding, ruminant and 
monogastric production, animal nutrition, animal feeds production, marketing and economics. A 
targeted HRD program will build on Specialist skills with further technical training over time. 
Source: DAHP (2001). 
 
While the desirability of these policies is not in question, their political feasibility is 
questionable. It should be noted that for all market (and by extension production)-
related policies, such as F1 and F2, to function properly the sine qua non assumption 
is that prices (which derive from markets) be right. Thus the political difficulties in 
addressing many of the forces distorting Cambodia's livestock markets renders many 
otherwise laudable policy proposals unfeasible by virtue of market distortions. 
Farmers still respond to better prices, including the presence of significant informal 
taxes, as they are rational actors (Popkin, 1979). It may therefore be worthwhile to 
consider interventions that address market constraints notwithstanding a difficult 
governance environment.  
With respect to the remaining strategies, DAHP’s behavior is typical of most 
departments within the government since informal revenue generation whether for 
oneself or the party effectively negates the effectiveness of pro-poor policies. A 
livestock professional (52) noted that to date, there is “no linkage between services 
and payments,” which contradicts the principle of full cost recovery explained in E1. 
Even self-initiated, externally financed training abroad comes at a price, since 
authorization from superiors is needed reported, as a livestock official (5) reported. 
Capacity building of department staff had been among the smallholder strategies 
proposed (H2, H3, H4), but refusal by key players to play by the rules of the game 
doomed its fate. A livestock professional (7) summed-up the situation: “I think you 
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However, while there is a discrepancy between what the government says and what it 
does, the authorities are not a monolithic predatory block. The experience of NGOs 
and donors when they collaborate, as in the case of VAHWs, is instructive. It took 
Vétérinaires Sans Frontières (VSF) five years and the help of the World Bank and IFAD 
to have a sub-decree recognizing VAHWs done, but it is one example of partnership 
that led to a desirable outcome and is discussed in detail in the next section. 
While the above can characterize donors’ (through APIP) and the Ministry’s (through 
DAHP up to the level of the Deputy Director/APIP National Coordinator) view of basic 
livestock and smallholder strategies, the government’s view (as seen through the 
actions of the Council of Ministers and the passage of sub-decrees) is much more 
focused on encouraging “private investment in livestock production” which translates 
into investment incentives for commercial operations and opportunities for rent-
seeking.  
Senior government officials’ bias in livestock is towards high technology, large 
commercial enterprises,
86 and exports. Where Cambodia’s regulatory course of things 
is allowed to progress, the focus has been on investment and how to promote large-
scale operations. While there are certainly ties to smallholders the view seems to be 
more of a laissez-faire nature. 
While the prospect of significant progress is slim, some options discussed above are 
politically feasible, and have an underlying relation to each other. The hold that 
corruption has on the country makes it very unlikely that changes needed to reduce 
the transaction costs in livestock marketing will be made. As such, improving 
preventive animal health is one avenue to reduce production costs and benefit the 
poor. Strategic entry points such as HPAI interventions (4.3), the creation of an FMD-
free zone (4.3), and gearing up to meet WTO standards all concentrate on aspects of 
animal health which have high externalities. Doing so could also be made to build on 
the success of regularizing VAHWs (4.4), for these workers could be given government 
or NGO contracts funded by donors to carry out the necessary preventive medicine 
measures while doing curative, fee-for-service work on the side.  
4.3  Strategic Entry Points 
(1) Developing a Strategic Framework for Agriculture 
While this paper has argued that the Donor-Government Nexus has produced too many 
Strategies and Plans, but too few funded mandates and feasible policies, it is 
surprising that donor and government attention towards agriculture has not been more 
focused. There does not exist, as yet, a medium-term sector strategy for agriculture 
nor an overall policy and strategic framework. Donors reached a consensus at the 
December 2004 CG. In the Joint Monitoring Indicators, they agreed with the 
Rectangular Strategy’s recommendation that: 
It is necessary to enhance and broaden the base for economic growth by opening and 
utilizing the potentials in other sectors, especially in the high potential agricultural and 
agroindustrial sectors, so that the nation will obtain larger positive windfall gains in the 
improvement of the livelihoods of the rural people. 
Based on the Joint Monitoring Indicators agreed upon at the 2004 Consultative Group 
meeting between Cambodia and donors, the benchmark stated: “Joint development of 
                                                 
86 There has been an emphasis on foreign direct investment in agriculture, and livestock in particular, for at least seven 
years. Sub-Decree 88 on the “Implementation of the Law on Investment of the Kingdom of Cambodia” dated 28 December 
1997 suggests such areas of investment as: 2. Livestock Production; 2.1 Livestock more than 1,000 heads; 2.2 Dairy farming 
more than 100 heads; 2.3 Poultry & eggs 10,000 heads. This was again repeated in Annex 1 to Sub-Decree 88 updated 
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a medium term sector strategy for agriculture, including irrigated agriculture, has 
been commenced by March 2005, with an overall policy and strategic framework 
completed by December 2005.” Recognizing the problem of youth unemployment, the 
65 page-long NGO Statement to the 2002 CG Meeting (19-21 June 2002) had already 
recommended that: 
Resources and efforts should go to develop a system of rural education, especially 
training for the rural youth in agriculture and agriculture related business. This training 
should be combined with loan program so that they can invest to start-up small 
enterprises in agriculture and agriculture related sector or other rural enterprises. (NGO 
Forum, 2002: 12) 
While it is not known precisely if any donors took-up this suggestion, it is worth 
repeating. NGO participation represents an opportunity for livestock and its related 
sectors to gain support. At the same time, it underscores the crucial need for a clear 
and focused agricultural policy for the country—as opposed to a wish list of projects 
for donors. Animal health needs to be regularized within this policy.  
(2) Strategic Entry: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza has been of considerable concern in Cambodia. 
Frequent articles now appear daily about HPAI in newspapers and other news media. 
The popularity of poultry plummets invariably when this happens. In response to the 
report of a potential HPAI outbreak, each province dispatches three taskforce teams: 
one to investigate and take samples, another to collect information and communicate 
back to the government, and one more to disinfect the area and control movement of 
poultry between farms and markets (Hamilton and Vong, 2005). “We only have three 
people in [the National Animal Health and Production Investigation Centre], not 
enough people to keep up with [testing] the chickens coming in.”
87  
There have been 14 outbreaks and one human infection to date (Hamilton and Vong, 
2005). Donors gave $1 million last year through FAO’s “Emergency Regional Support 
for Post Avian Influenza Rehabilitation” Project to help coordinate activities funding 
for which has nearly been exhausted. “Donors said they were waiting on an official 
request from the government for more funding” (Hamilton and Vong, 2005). Sorn San, 
Head of National Animal Health and Production Investigation Centre reported that five 
thousand VAHWs had been trained in detection and identification of bird flu through 
the Agricultural Productivity Improvement Project funded by the World Bank and 
IFAD. The lessons learned from APIP are shown in the following box and are 
particularly germane to future development of pro-poor livestock policy. 
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IFAD’s Lessons Learned from the Agricultural Productivity 
Improvement Project 
The livestock component of the IFAD loan offers four lessons learned 
which should be heeded for future activities in the sector. It is an 
excellent opportunity to examine the lessons learned from that multi-
year project. 
Functional grass-roots associations and institutions capable of delivering 
veterinary supplies, animal feeds and artificial insemination equipment 
are crucial to the sustainability of project components.  
Farmers will only benefit from the project if the technical knowledge 
developed reaches them and takes account of their views. This requires 
mechanisms for transfer and continuous feedback among central and 
provincial government departments and among districts, communes and 
farms.  
The enthusiasm and commitment of project staff are important factors 
in successful project implementation, especially when external 
conditions are difficult.  
Privatization of animal health services depends on government 
commitment and acceptance of a user-pays basis by farmers and 
animal-health workers. 
Source: IFAD (undated). 
 
While the lessons learned are couched in diplomatic language, as was explored 
earlier, Cambodia’s KR Legacy is primarily responsible for the erosion of the trust 
needed for grass-roots associations and institutions (cooperatives) to emerge. 
Overcoming this legacy will take time. 
Second, there is essentially no mechanism for transfer and continuous feedback 
among authorities because of the centralized nature of the system and the 
hierarchical social relations (Turner, 2002), but NGOs have tried to bridge this gap as 
best they can, sometimes drawing scorn from authorities according to a livestock 
professional (21) and a senior government official (40). Finally, as in all development 
work and previously seen in the section on the Donor-Government Nexus, one of the 
key lessons is that government commitment and acceptance are needed before 
embarking on any project. 
A study conducted during July and August 2004 by VSF at the request of DAHP and FAO 
found that the severe losses incurred by smallholders during HPAI were partly 
compensated by very high prices for poultry following the crisis by consumers whose 
willingness to pay was high. VSF recommends financial compensation to producers 
officially HPAI-infected (to recover for their losses and to encourage disease reporting 
by producers in the future) and urges the design and implementation of a 
comprehensive national policy to develop and secure poultry production in Cambodia 
(VSF, 2004: 2). These recommendations are further reinforced by the findings of a 
Regional Workshop on HPAI which are shown Box. 4. Policy Context: Sector Challenges, Pro-poor Livestock Policies and Strategic Entries 
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HPAI Recommendations for Region  
(Ayutthaya Regional Workshop) 
Smallholders have been the most vulnerable group during the Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza outbreaks in most countries, and they are 
hardly recovering; support to this poorest group will help to secure 
their incomes as well as having them on board for surveillance and 
reporting systems. The following options will contribute to improve 
poultry production in this sector: 
Improving Animal Health Services at village level needs to include 
support from Animal Health Workers (paravets), including reporting 
systems and access to information and training. Government extension 
staff cannot bring the appropriate support in all villages. 
Improving the general farmers’ awareness through appropriate and 
translated simple biosecurity guidelines on A.I. 
Use of credit or microfinance as a tool for rehabilitation and as an 
alternative to direct compensation for countries that can not afford to 
compensate. 
Access to appropriate long term credit. 
Development of farmer groups and associations will help to strengthen 
the farmers activities and the dissemination of information 
Source: Dolberg (2005: 29). 
 
Unfortunately, the government has no financial compensation to owners when animals 
are culled (VSF, 2004). Certainly, it is not clear how much one would compensate nor 
how since the government consistently maintains it has no financial means. While 
continuation of the current FAO HPAI project is important in that it entails 
recommendations one and two, option five will encounter the aforementioned 
problems of low social cohesion/social capital earlier discussed.  
If donors wished to target the lowest quintile, requiring that the smallholder be a 
female head of household or those individuals who owned poultry and at most pigs, 
would certainly be one possibility (although the feasibility of this would need to be 
studied). Most village chiefs have detailed household records, and family books (bann 
krousa) clearly show all residents living under the same roof. This information could 
be related to an MFI with necessary financial controls and auditing. Another idea 
raised in discussions: training of breeders (in excess of 500 heads) was proffered by a 
livestock professional (52) and may be feasible within the scope of additional donor 
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(3) Export of Livestock and FMD-Free Zone 
Cambodia’s terms of accession to WTO were not ideal for the country’s level of 
development (Oxfam, 2003).
88 In 2002, NGO Forum took the opportunity to comment 
on the NPRS to state that “NGOs are concerned with … the lack of public consultation 
and debate about the possible impact on small farmers of WTO membership and the 
Agreement on Agriculture.” (NGO Forum, 2002). While concessions on agricultural 
products may have been too harshly negotiated, the livestock sub-sector offers good 
potential for cross-border trade. Combined with strong and growing regional demand 
(see table), the export of Cambodian livestock could be a golden opportunity for the 
country, if properly exploited. 
Table 8:  In Demand: ASEAN, Rest of Asia and Middle East Cattle Imports in 2002  
Importer 2002 (head) 
Asean  Rest of Asia  Middle East 
Brunei 
Darussalam  23,300  China  11,500  Bahrain  8,146 
Indonesia 171,100  Hong Kong  48,000  Israel 52,730 
Malaysia 97,000  Japan 14,500  Jordan 40,200 
Philippines 117,100  Macao 5,300  Kuwait 7,400 
Thailand 183,000  Nepal 12,000  Lebanon 222,680 
      Saudi Arabia  39,000 
       United Arab 
Emirates  4,600 
      Egypt 153,000 
Source: FAOSTAT 2004 from MoC and MPDF (2005). 
 
Total imports for ASEAN were 591,500 heads of cattle in 2002, while the rest of Asia 
accounted for only 91,300 and the Middle East took in 527,756. 
Trade Regime and Tariffs
89 
While trade in beef meat is dominated by tariff quotas and special access conditions – 
especially those negotiated in the main Asian markets by the US and Australia – that in 
livestock is more open. All major importing countries, however, have often 
complicated and demanding SPS measures in place. ASEAN markets are largely duty-
free. That is the case for Malaysia and Indonesia, while the Philippines imposes a 
three percent duty and Thailand imposes five percent (apart from pure-bred breeding 
animals which are zero rated). The official duty on the Vietnamese border is five 
percent. Cambodia enjoys duty-free access to the Chinese market through the “early 
harvest” arrangement. Cambodia’s own border conditions for the entry of live cattle 
entail a Most Favored Nation tariff of 15% with an Asean Free Trade Area Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff rate of 10% in 2004. Middle Eastern markets are also 
largely open although several countries have bound high tariffs in the WTO. 
                                                 
88 Oxfam (2003) reports that the country acceded to a maximum tariff on agricultural products of only 60% (see table). In 
comparison, this rate is half Canada’s (120%) and the USA (121%), and many times less than the European Union (252%). 
Moreover, Cambodia also agreed not to use export subsidies in agriculture. 
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Bahrain  35% bound tariff in the WTO; currently applied rate at 5% 
Israel   128% bound tariff (43% for pure-bred breeding cattle) in the 
WTO; currently applied rate within a 120,000 head quota is 
zero 
Jordan  Applied and WTO bound rate is: 5% plus 10JD/head 
Kuwait  100% plus 15% stamp duty bound in the WTO; applied rate is 5% 
Lebanon  Applied rate of 0% (Negotiating WTO accession) 
Saudi Arabia  Applied rate of 0% (Negotiating WTO accession) 
United Arab Emirates  15% bound tariff in the WTO; 5% applied 
Egypt  10% bound tariff in the WTO; applied rates less but uncertain 
 
Livestock Exports 
Based on earlier detailed animal population statistics (section 3.2, sub-section The 
Herd) of 3.55 million animals (including 625,930 buffalos), the local market has been 
met largely from spent draft animals and surplus young animals (MoC and MPDF, 
2005). There is a large exportable surplus of cattle. Cambodia has a comparative 
advantage in production of large ruminants because of its abundance in grazing land; 
and the country’s livestock production, following traditional raising method and using 
natural fodders, could be labeled organic should an accredited national organic 
certification system exist for this purpose (Srey, 2005). This is reportedly why 
Malaysians desire Cambodian cattle according to a private sector manager (1).
90 
Furthermore, if organic certification were implemented, this could produce a 
premium of 20-50% over current prices (Srey, 2005). 
RGC (2005) reports that trade in cattle is already significant for Cambodia’s neighbors 
though it warns that “Official figures certainly underestimate the true picture.”
91 The 
reality is that Cambodian animals are taken across the Vietnam and Thai borders in 
small numbers and on an informal basis primarily because formal imports of 
Cambodian cattle have been affected in recent years by Foot-and-Mouth disease fears 
in the two markets (MoC and MPDF, 2005). McNaughton (2004) estimates that 
Cambodia live cattle export to Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia in 2002 was in the 
range of 80,000-150,000 heads (McNaughton, 2004).
92 Apart from lost revenue to the 
Cambodian government, cattle producers also lose the value added through fattening, 
which takes place across the border.  
                                                 
90 Cambodia has been exporting to Malaysia legally through a special arrangement Sen Sovann (DAHP) made with his 
counterpart in Malaysia. Heavy informal transactions costs ($250, 19 illegal checkpoints, speed-boats chase) and an outbreak 
of FMD on a 2003 shipment (2 animals tested positive) stopped shipments for three to four months. The firm has ceased 
livestock operation to Malaysia as of May 2005. A livestock professional (60), asked for reasons why this happened had this to 
say: “Rent seeking is a singular but not … overriding if stock is in good quality as it is based on a per head basis. The yield of 
the stock they were shipping was not good due to age factors etc and there was a cost of feeding even if they owned it and 
cheap as they back loaded it [the barge returned with palm feed for the feedlot]. The rumor was that as the margin shrank 
so the arguments started. They lost a lot of money when they had an FMD break-down last year as they had to buy feed 
locally. The supply of stock is getting smaller and the price is rising. This was not helped by Vietnam seeking cows as part of 
their demobilization program that put cow prices over $500 for Haryana types and dragged the price for the rest with them. 
The failure had nothing to do with FMD per see and the concept of the Disease Free Zone remains inviolate.”  
91 FAOSTAT reports Myanmar exporting 113,000 head in 2002, China 58,000, Lao PDR 35,300 and Cambodia 10,600. 
92 Just as an indication, a 1997 animal movement management Conference estimated 52,000 cattle quarantined in Thailand 
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Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
With respect to SPS measures, Cambodia secured a delay until 2008 as part of its WTO 
package. A livestock professional (21) with half a decade’s worth of experience in 
Cambodia was critical of the OIE for not showing sufficient flexibility for Cambodia’s 
circumstances. A livestock NGO head (33) said that his organization’s headquarters 
had attempted to mollify OIE with respect to Cambodia (the suggestion was, again 
that standards were too high for a developing country like Cambodia). Finally another 
livestock professional (52) argued that the assumption on meeting such requirements 
by the authorities was that rules had no importance in Cambodia, but that they would 
be sorely surprised when standards are applied. WTO/OIE will not allow agreements to 
be violated. For its part, OIE Regional Representation for Asia and the Pacific was 
more circumspect: 
 
The OIE has worked together with Cambodia to improve animal health conditions in 
various fields under OIE mandates. Securing the disease-free status is one of the most 
critical aspects … For example, [Cambodia] is one of the active members of the OIE Foot 
and Mouth Disease Control Campaign in Southeast Asia. The [Royal Government of 
Cambodia] and the OIE are working together for a purpose of the effective control of 
FMD. Of course, we have many other important diseases to tackle, such as avian influenza 
... (OIE official, 32) 
 
SPS measures have become the new non-tariff trade barriers that will impact 
Cambodia for years to come, and the country needs to ready itself for the challenge. 
The principle of trade in livestock is simple, no country would want to legally import 
anything it deems of lower sanitary and phytosanitary standards than what it produces 
(for obvious public health reasons). A livestock professional (35) said that the reality 
was that Cambodia could not ignore OIE now that it had become a WTO member and 
so, despite unrealistic demands on the country, it needed to do something to placate 
their demands. Otherwise, Cambodia could be flooded by livestock products of low 
SPS standards. His bottom line was that while OIE’s demands are unrealistic, they 
cannot be ignored, and it does not mean they were wrong either. 
Foot-and-Mouth Disease Free Zone 
Cambodia’s active participation in the Southeast Asia Foot and Mouth Disease 
(SEAFMD) program is welcomed news. It is evident that the influence of international 
processes such as Cambodia’s accession to WTO and SPS Agreement (2008), while 
difficult now, may prove rewarding in the future as well. Furthermore, the 
emergence, likely sooner than 2008, of a Foot-and-Mouth Disease Free status for the 
legal importation of cattle from Cambodia into Malaysia and other regional neighbors 
means that unless Cambodia takes concrete steps to create an FMD-free zone, the 
country will never be able to legally export cattle to these countries. This highlights 
the challenge that an open trade policy has presented to Cambodia. It also presents 
an opportunity to meet this challenge directly by creating an FMD-free zone.  
Within Cambodia, types O and Asia 1 have appeared regularly during FMD outbreaks 
(ACIAR, 2003). The disease is endemic throughout the country. Suan and Siveth (1993) 
noted that the disease has been most often observed in ruminants and most cases are 
seen in May–December. During this time the demand for animals as a source of 
draught power is greatest, and the resulting inability of buffalo and cattle to assist in 
preparation of fields for crop establishment inflicts substantial costs on farming 
communities. 
FMD diagnostic capability was established with FAO assistance in 1996-1997 according 
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ACIAR-funded projects. At present, there is limited vaccination of livestock in 
Cambodia, although a feedlot industry in the south is growing and requires 
appropriate FMD management. Vaccination primarily occurs in the border areas of 
Vietnam and it is likely that enhanced diagnostic capability has had some impact 
(ACIAR, 2003).  
Political and Economic Feasibility of an FMD-Free Zone 
Since it may take numerous years before the entire country can achieve FMD-free 
status, creating an FMD-free zone in Kampong Som, where the port city of 
Sihanoukville is located or elsewhere in order to legally export cattle and buffalo and 
other ruminants in consequential quantities would make sense according to a livestock 
professional (21). This would align the country’s senior leadership, which has a bias 
towards agro-business exports, and key players in the private sector, to produce a 
win-win situation. The Kampong Som/Sihanoukville region has a mountain range 
separating it from the rest of the country, which OIE regulations require (physical or 
geographical barriers) and would be ideal.  
As the Southeast Asian region moves towards FMD-free status, and Malaysia adopts the 
standard in 2006, that market too will be closed off to Cambodia, according to a 
private sector manager (1). While smuggling of Cambodian cattle into neighboring 
countries will no doubt continue, when those neighboring countries implement higher 
sanitary standards, the price of Cambodian cattle, traveling by hoof to cross borders, 
according to a multilateral donor official (57), and losing weight on the way, will be 
significantly lower. Serious consideration should be given to attract public-private 
partnership in developing this market potential further in light of Cambodia’s 
accession to WTO. One of the crucial elements to developing Cambodia’s livestock 
export market rests on the improvement of veterinary services. 
(4) Continued Improvement of Veterinary Services through VAHWs 
It was in the absence of animal health services in rural areas that Vétérinaires Sans 
Frontières introduced Village Animal Health Workers in 1996. VAHWs are trained 
villagers in animal health and production who are then deployed in their villages and 
communes. 
In 2004, MAFF reported that the development of animal health and production 
services at commune and village levels had reached 4,449 VAHWs or 75% of a planned 
5,906 needed (MAFF, 2004).
93 It was not entirely clear how the number 5,906 was 
arrived at, as there are circa 1,600 communes and tens of thousands of villages. 
Assuming even spread (which is not the case), this would produce about three to four 
VAHWs per commune. Of course, this “stock” figure does not take into account drop-
outs. AusAID (2005) reports that government-donor sponsored VAHW activities in a 
specific locality studied have faced resistance for payment of services, with up to 25% 
of the VAHWs ceasing practice because fellow villagers have baulked at payment. The 
report recommends that “steps toward sustainability will often be difficult but any 
temptation to continue with unsustainable handouts must be resisted in market-
focused activities” (AusAID, 2005: 4). Another issue that is evident is the problematic 
relationship of VAHWs (who only recently gained any kind of official recognition) with 
the establishment, namely State veterinarians.
94 
                                                 
93 It is not certain how the MAFF is counting VAHWs. These are likely the ones it recognizes. NGOs working on their own are 
producing hundreds of VAHWs. For example, PADEK, a local NGO, has trained two VAHWs, one man and one woman (for 
gender equity reasons), in 268 villages since 1996. 
94 In the context of Africa, Leonard (2003) discusses the changing markets for health and veterinary services, and argues (1) 
for the need to retain a central role for paraprofessionals in any new delivery system; (2) the important and problematic 
relationship between professional veterinarians and VAHWs; (3) the importance of developing state contracting procedures 
for assisting the private delivery of preventive animal health services with high externalities and to minimize problems of 4. Policy Context: Sector Challenges, Pro-poor Livestock Policies and Strategic Entries 
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A livestock professional (51) viewed VAHWs as de-linked from the rest of the official 
veterinary infrastructure. Indeed, VSF (2004: 2) confirms this:  
Although this is not specific to Cambodia, the poor linkage between poultry producers 
and service providers is an aspect that should be dealt with more attention: 80% of 
poultry smallholders do not use any animal health service; links between private 
veterinarians/companies or Village Animal Health Workers, on one hand, and State 
Veterinary services, on the other hand are limited.  
Veterinarian and MAFF Secretary of State Yim Vanthoeun claims "We have enough 
human resources, about 10,000 veterinarians, but we don't have money for vaccines."
95  
Official Recognition of VAHWs in Theory 
While the privatization of animal health services was a goal of APIP, this was already 
true in practice (de facto) from 1996 onwards, and became de jure in 2001. That 
year, Anukret (sub-decree) No. 26 on the Creation and Regulation of Village Animal 
Health Workers on 2 March 2001 was adopted by the Council of Ministers and signed by 
the Prime Minister. Anukret No. 26 states that VAHWs are not government workers, 
they are chosen among local people or students who are trained and/or provided with 
technical refresher training by the MAFF. The Anukret is intended to allow for the 
training of VAHWs in a bid to offer jobs for people and to increase animal productivity 
and quality in line with the government’s policy on the privatization of agricultural 
and animal health sectors aimed at contributing to poverty reduction in rural areas.
96  
In practice, VAHWs have been allowed to operate in peace for some years. According 
to an livestock professional (52) one organization, Vétérinaires Ruraux du Cambodge 
(VRC), has been recognized by the government to provide training (aside from itself). 
VRC, a local NGO, is a VSF spin-off. The same livestock professional (52) also 
complained that some NGOs continue to train without knowing the regulatory 
framework now in place or do not want to know about the rules of the game. An NGO 
director (55) interviewed that has trained hundreds of VAHWs since 1996 was surprised 
to learn of the sub-decree’s existence, and requested copies of the sub-decree. 
Regularizing VAHWs in Practice Through HPAI and FMD Preventive 
Campaigns 
VAHWs represent a vast, mostly untapped potential in preventative animal health 
care. Effective interventions against both HPAI and FMD offer significant externalities. 
The role of both government and NGOs, to provide public goods, could engage VAHWs 
in contracts to vaccinate, inform, and train smallholders. The contracts would put 
them in contact with many more of the poor than they currently reach. In fact, given 
the high dangers associated with HPAI and the high mortalities in Cambodia with 
various poultry and swine diseases it is possible that some livestock producers would 
be prepared to pay a portion of the costs of inoculations themselves.
97 Putting donor 
money either through the government or NGOs into contracts to private providers to 
do preventive animal health is consistent with the World Bank's neo-liberal stance and 
analysis (see Leonard, 2003). This stance, combined with the HPAI emergency, 
increases the likelihood of successful donor funding.  
                                                                                                                                                          
local monopoly; and (4) the central role that professionalism will have to play in this area if collective goods and the public 
interest are to be served. As will become evident, many of these issues are ones with which Cambodia is now grappling. 
95As quoted in Wasson and Lor (2005). MAFF reports 4,449 VAHWs, so Yim Vanthoeun’s number suggests that the remainder 
must be professional veterinarians or a grossly exaggerated figure. The actual staffers in DAHP cannot be but a fraction of 
the 9,128 staff of MAFF (of whom 3,633 worked at the central level) in 2001. 
96 All legal documents cited in this section were informally translated courtesy of Sok Dara (Vétérinaires Sans Frontières). 




To use the metaphor of the late senior United Nations official Sergio Viera de Mello 
when speaking about East Timor, governing Cambodia is like “sailing a ship while 
building it.”
98 This paper has presented some of the constraints and opportunities in 
implementing feasible pro-poor livestock policies “when external conditions are 
difficult” to use the language of IFAD. Failures of governance combined with donor 
apathy towards agriculture and livestock have cost Cambodia dearly. To be fair, it can 
be said that Cambodia emerged from decades of warfare with, understandably, more 
important priorities. These priorities, like meeting basic food security through the 
production of rice, have not produced the results for which so many had hoped 
either.
99 There is no agricultural policy, or rather, as a bilateral donor official (49) 
pointedly said, there are too many strategies. Every donor has “helped” the 
government write its own strategy.  
The end result has been an uncoordinated ad hoc emergency approach that created 
more papers and committees than results. Within the legislative context, other 
priorities also took precedent over livestock—forestry and fisheries being chief among 
them, which led to the passage of a Forestry Law and work on a new Fisheries Law. 
However, while the government has done the donors bidding on the legislative front, 
it remains to be seen whether the letter, not to speak of the spirit, of these laws will 
be respected. Thanks to momentum built from the December 2004 CG, a Phnom Penh 
consensus has emerged that agriculture should receive more attention. Many will 
agree and this paper has argued that it is Cambodia’s best hope for survival in the 
global economy following the end of garment quotas to the United States. If nothing 
else, the 150,000-250,000 new entrants into the labor market per year should give the 
government and donors pause. As such, the agricultural sector and the livestock sub-
sector have an important role to play if their considerable potential is tapped properly 
as farming continues to shift from subsistence to commercial agriculture over the next 
decade. The prospect for increased donor attention and coordination with the 
government in this area is better than it has ever been in recent years. This should be 
cause for optimism in a country where 88% of the poor come from rural areas, and in 
which 80% of the population is rural. Livestock can and should take its rightful role in 
the forthcoming medium-term sector strategy on agriculture.  
A major objective of this paper has been to recommend feasible pro-poor livestock 
(and livestock-sector related) policies from the set already in existence. This proved 
difficult. These policies, four years on, are still collecting dust. After more than fifty 
interviews with senior policymakers, middle managers, and staff in the public, 
private, and tertiary sectors, few pro-poor policies for livestock are realizable. 
Despite this, there have been the occasional successes and there are opportunities 
ahead. 
The Glass is Still Half Full 
One of the qualified successes in pro-poor livestock development policy in the past 
decade has been the acceptance of VAHWs by the authorities. While 80% of poultry 
breeders have not been exposed to VAHWs in 2004, it is a remarkable feat that 20% 
have, and that prior to 1996, none would have been serviced. That in eight years two 
million smallholders have interacted at some point with VAHWs is a remarkable 
achievement.  
                                                 
98 Adapted from a speech by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Undersecretary General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
United Nations, in a speech to the World Affairs Council’s Asilomar Conference, May 2004 (see Guéhenno, 2004). 
99 One senior Government official (54) even argued that the goal of donors is merely to help Cambodia achieve subsistence 
and nothing more. 5. Conclusion 
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VAHWs are allowed to work in relative peace and are indeed even praised. Going 
forward, it would appear that having built the regulatory foundation, what is still 
needed is for donors, NGOs, and DAHP/MAFF to keep growing the current "stock" of 
4,449 VAHWs so that they can continue to directly intervene in the basic health care 
of smallholder animals. Donors, together with NGOs and the private sector, should 
continue to engage the government in a discourse about pro-poor policy development 
in this context. 
Based on the constraints and opportunities detailed in this paper, and from which 
strategies and resources can drawn, three sets of suitable entry points for pro-poor 
livestock policy can be summarized. These recommendations are by no means 
exhaustive, but it is believed that they offer politically feasible opportunities for pro-
poor engagement in livestock and livestock-sector related activities:  
5.1  Coat-tailing on the development of an agricultural policy that 
includes proper emphasis on livestock and Highly Pathogenic 
Avian Influenza support strategic entry points for donors and 
the government include: 
•  Agricultural Policy: The Consultative Group meeting in December 2004 called upon 
the start of a medium-term sector strategy for agriculture in March 2005, with an 
overall policy and strategic framework completed by December 2005. Donors 
concluded that “it is necessary to enhance and broaden … agricultural and 
agroindustrial sectors, so that the nation will obtain larger positive windfall gains in 
the improvement of the livelihoods of the rural people” (2004 Priority Monitoring 
Indicators). In this regard, the role of NGOs has not been defined in the Technical 
Working Groups even though their representative at the 2004 CG explicitly 
requested, and the World Bank acknowledged inclusion. Given the ad hoc history of 
NGO involvement in previous Thematic Working Groups, this role should be 
formalized. The record of their efforts on VAHWs is an important one, and the pro-
poor perspective they will bring to the table is invaluable. Further, the targeting of 
widows or single women heads of households and families that own no draught 
animals should be given consideration, as these are likely to be among the poorest. 
•  Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza support: Donors may be interested in supporting 
efforts to combat the HPAI regional public health threat. Cambodia’s overextended 
surveillance system contained in NAHPIC, with funding from donors through FAO, at 
the time of this writing was slated to run out. Donors awaited a government 
request for support. While it is likely that the approach taken will be a repeat of 
the earlier project with continued emphasis on training of VAHWs, it should also 
consider training of poultry breeders. The government has also made clear, 
contrary to the recommendations of VSF (2004) that no compensation will be given. 
This is financially damaging to breeders, and naturally makes them less than willing 
to declare their problems to the authorities.
100 Another possibility for action would 
be to provide credit through a Microfinance Institution with wide reach to those 
individuals whose animals have been culled. As above, pro-poor targeting of 
livestock smallholders could focus on widows or single women heads of households 
or families without draught animals. Otherwise the poor will be unwilling to raise 
significant numbers of poultry, for the risks will be too great. They would revert to 
a few back-yard animals, if that, where the costs of loss would be manageable. 
Well-to-do producers can hope to ride out the loss of a flock and make the money 
                                                 
100 Hamilton and Vong (2005) report that one farmer, Ouch You, who unknowingly had AI-infected poultry, said: “I found two 
or three dead chickens every morning. I buried them and took the healthy looking ones to the markets.” 5. Conclusion 
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back with higher prices on a subsequent lot, but the poor would lack the capital – 
or access to loans – to do this. Finally, since VAHWs are unpaid, they cannot be 
expected to serve an effective public service function unless government embraces 
them as full partners by proceeding with provincial-level licensing and training, 
working in good faith not only with donors but NGOs as well. 
5.2  Exploit Cambodia’s Comparative Advantage in Livestock Exports 
and Create an FMD-Free Zone 
Cambodia is poised to take advantage of booming demand for livestock, and it should 
not fail to do so because the window of opportunity is narrowing with FMD-free status 
required by 2006 and SPS Agreement in 2008. The private sector and/or Donors 
(AusAID’s follow-up steps on the options paper states that it is willing "to contribute to 
a range of studies or small value contracts to enhance and inform policy/strategy 
discussions through the [Thematic Working Group on Agriculture and Water]”
101) may 
be interested in funding  additional research on the impact of WTO  on agricultural 
smallholders with a view to the livestock sub-sector, risks and prospects, and to give 
serious consideration to the establishment of an FMD-free zone, whether in 
Sihanoukville or elsewhere, in order to secure a foothold for Cambodian cattle trade 
regionally. Livestock has been shown to hold vast, mostly untapped potential for the 
economy (80,000-150,000 heads were exported unofficially) that could be critical to 
Cambodia’s overall prosperity. Its development can be a major contribution to poverty 
reduction. 
5.3  Regularization of VAHWs through contractual agreements with 
the government and/or NGOs  
While poverty reduction has been the mantra of the government for a number of 
years, the results have not been encouraging. Poverty and inequality may have 
increased, based on projections, since the mid-1990s. Illiteracy, and both infant and 
under-five infant mortality have increased since 1990. This may be linked with 
underinvestment in agriculture by donors, compounded by issues in markets, access, 
and land, but it is also a clear failure of governance by the authorities. The official 
recognition of VAHWs is a relative success story that should be regularized by 
examining the potential for contractual agreement between VAHWs and the 
government. However, if the political status quo remains, donors may wish to by-pass 
the government altogether, as they have clearly voted with their pocket-books to do 
so in refusing to fund any of the items on the government’s wish list for livestock since 
2002, and to work directly with the poor on their own or through NGOs which have 
been effective in promoting vaccination and animal health services in rural areas, 
especially as it relates to HPAI and FMD prevention. 
                                                 
101 It further notes: “We also propose to explore the livestock value chain, but as a secondary item and most likely in 
partnership with another donor (such as the EC). Next step: Begin discussions with other donors and stakeholders with an 
interest in livestock and give consideration to a joint feasibility/design study in late 2005/early 2006. There may be an 
opportunity to discuss these options further with Government and donors at the agribusiness workshop planned for late 
March-early April 2005. AusAID’s past experience and strengths lie more at the production end of the value chain but we are 
interested in exploring other possible areas for engagement."  
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ANNEX: CODED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS 
Code  Descriptor  Location  Date 
1  Private sector manager  Phnom Penh  15 July 2004 
2  Local independent consultant  Phnom Penh  16 July 2004 
3  Local independent consultant  Phnom Penh  19 July 2004 
4  Private sector manager  Sihanoukville & Sre Ambil, 
Koh Kong 
27 July 2004 
5  Livestock official  Phnom Penh  30 July 2004 
6  Bilateral donor official  Phnom Penh  2 August 2004 
7  Livestock professional  Phnom Penh  2 August 2004 
8 Former  senior  government 
official 
Phnom Penh  3 August 2004 
9  Livestock official  Phnom Penh  3 August 2004 
10  Multilateral donor official  Phnom Penh  4 August 2004 
11  Livestock educator  Kampong Cham  4 August 2004 
12  Multilateral donor official  Phnom Penh  6 August 2004 
13  Multilateral Donor official  Phnom Penh  9 August 2004 
14  Livestock official  Phnom Penh  11 August 2004 
15  Livestock educator  Kandal  14 August 2004 
16  Local independent consultant  Phnom Penh  16 August 2004 
17  FAO official  Phnom Penh International 
Airport 
19 August 2004 
18  Development professional  Phnom Penh  20 August 2004 
19  Donor project team leader  Phnom Penh  20 August 2004 
20  Member of School Committee  Kampong Chhnang  24 August 2004 
21  Livestock professional  Phnom Penh  26 August 2004 
22  Government official  Phnom Penh  30 August 2004 
23  FAO professional  Phnom Penh  31 August 2004 
24  MFI head of public relations  Phnom Penh  31 August 2004 
25 Multilateral  donor  official  Phnom Penh  2 September 2004 
26  Bilateral donor official  Phnom Penh  4 September 2004 
27 Multilateral  donor  official  Phnom Penh  6 September 2004 
28  Livestock NGO official  Phnom Penh  7 September 2004 
29  Private sector entrepreneur  Kampong Speu Province  7 September 2004 
30  MFI Credit Department 
Manager 
Phnom Penh  16 September 2004 
31  FAO official  Denmark  5 November 2004 
32  OIE official  Japan  12 November 2004 
33  Livestock NGO head   Phnom Penh  23 November 2004 
34  Villagers and Commune Chief  Takeo Province  3 December 2004 
35  Livestock professional  Phnom Penh  7 December 2004 
36  Livestock professional  Phnom Penh  11 December 2004 
37  Village Animal Health Worker  Takeo Province  21 December 2004 
38  Livestock professional  Phnom Penh  28 December 2004 
39  Private sector official  Phnom Penh  10 January 2005 
40  Senior government official  Phnom Penh  3 February 2005 Annex: Coded Interviews and Other Communications 
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Code  Descriptor  Location  Date 
41  FAO official  Phnom Penh  4 February 2005 
42  Multilateral donor official  Phnom Penh  7 February 2005 
43  Livestock project team leader  Phnom Penh  11 February 2005 
44  MAFF official  Phnom Penh  14 February 2005 
45  Government Advisor  Phnom Penh  15 February 2005 
46  Livestock professional  Phnom Penh  15 February 2005 
47  Livestock official  Phnom Penh  16 February 2005 
48  Senior Government official  Phnom Penh  17 February 2005 
49  Bilateral donor official  Phnom Penh  17 February 2005 
50  Extension official  Phnom Penh  17 February 2005 
51  Livestock professional  Kandal Province  18 February 2005 
52  Livestock professional  Phnom Penh  18 February 2005 
53  Senior government official  Phnom Penh  21 February 2005 
54  Senior government official  Phnom Penh  21 February 2005 
55  NGO Director and NGO 
professional 
Phnom Penh  21 February 2005 
56 Livestock  education 
professional 
Chamcar Daung (outskirts of 
Phnom Penh) 
22 February 2005 
57 Multilateral  donor  official  Phnom Penh  22 February 2005 
58  Bilateral donor official  Phnom Penh  26 April 2005 
59  Multilateral donor official  Phnom Penh  1 May 2005 
60  Livestock professional  Phnom Penh  16 May 2005 
Senior government official indicates political appointee.  
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LIST OF INDIVIDUALS MET OR CONTACTED 
Name(s)  Title 
Achilles Costales  Livestock Economist, Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative, FAO 
Anonymous employee  SE Australia Live Cattle Development Co., Phnom Penh 
Anonymous member  Trapeang Kdar Village School Committee, Tma Edth commune, Kampong 
Chhnang Province 
Catherine Arnold  Agriculture and Natural Resources Team Member, DFID, London 
Chamnan Lim  Advisor, Aid Coordination and Partnerships, United Nations Development 
Programme 
Chanthou Boua and 
Taing Soksithon 
Director and Program Support Officer, respectively, PADEK 
Chau Khim  Former FAO National Consultant on Avian Flu, MAFF 
Elliott Potter  Independent animal health and production consultant 
Fleur Davies and Heam 
Vuthy 
Representative and Senior Program Officer, respectively, AusAid 
Frands Dolberg  FAO International Coordinator TCP/RAS/3010 (E) & Associate Professor, 
University of Aarhus, Denmark 
Georg Deichert  Advisor, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) 
In Siphann  Credit Department Manager, Acleda Bank 
James Brew  Project Manager, International Finance Corporation 
Kean Sophea  Team Leader, Food Security and Poverty Reduction, MAFF 
Khieu Borin  Director, University of Tropical Agriculture Foundation (Cambodia) Centre 
for Livestock and Agriculture Development (CelAgrid) 
Kuy Huot  Deputy Director, Department of Agricultural Extension, MAFF 
Ly Vanthoeun  Secretary of State, MAFF 
Mak Soeung  Deputy Director, Department of International Cooperation and Statistics, 
MAFF 
Mark Turner  Professor, School of Business and Government, University of Camberra 
Meak Pramol  Agricultural Advisor Livestock, CEDAC, and qualified veterinarian 
Ngy Chanphal and Ly 
Bun Meng 
Both Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Rural Development 
Nou Muth  Undersecretary of State, in charge of livestock, MAFF 
Nouv Kanun and Ney 
Sokhim 
Secretary General and Director of Agriculture, respectively, Council for 
Agricultural and Rural Development 
Pit Chhum Loan  Faculty of Animal Health and Production, Royal University of Agriculture 
Rath Sophak and Un 
Theang 
ADB Domestic Consultant, School Facilities Engineer and Deputy Director, 
State Assets, MoEYS  
Robert Hagemann  Resident Representative, IMF 
Sandra Hudd  Senior Program Officer, AusAID 
Sao Sopheap  Assistant FAO Representative (Programme) 
Satha Oeung and Yusuf 
Dayan 
Management and Staff of Mong Retthy and RML Livestock 
Sen Sovann  Deputy Director, Department of Animal Health and Production, MAFF 
Seng Sokerya, Chhay 
Thy, and Sam Kal 
Officer In Charge (Admin and Finance), Research Officer, and Lab Officer, 
respectively, CelAgrid, UTA (Cambodia) 
So Sovann  Poultry farm owner (100,000 eggs per day) 
Sok Sophea  Head, Public Relation and Call Center Unit, Acleda Bank List of Individuals Met or Contacted 
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Name(s)  Title 
Som Naron  Rector, Kampong Cham Agriculture School 
Soy Seng   FAO staff member 
Srey Chanty  Local independent consultant, Agriculture 
Sriram Mathe  Team Leader, Asian Development Bank Education Sector Loan, Ministry of 
Education, Youth and Sports 
Stefano Linguanato  Head of Mission, Vétérinaires Sans Frontières 
Stephanie Desvaux  Former adviser for French Cooperation at the Department of Animal 
Health and Production then worked for FAO on HPAI for three months 
Steve Schonberger  Rural Development Specialist, World Bank 
Sum Manit  Advisor to RGC 
Suon Sothoeun  Deputy Director, Department of Animal Health and Production, MAFF 
Teruhide Fujita  Regional Representative, OIE Regional Representation 
Tony Felts  Head of European Community Livestock Project 
Village Animal Health 
Workers 
Vétérinaires Sans Frontières Mission 
Villagers and Commune 
Chief 
Vétérinaires Sans Frontières Mission 
Wolfram Jaeckel  Agriculture/Rural Development Specialist, Asian Development Bank 
Xavier D’Abzac  Advisor to National Assembly Chairman, Prince Norodom Ranariddh 
Yves Froehlich  FAO Consultant and owner of Agrovet, an animal drugs firm 
 